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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XIX DECEMBER, 1950 NUMBER 3
THE GROTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE
SEAS REAPPRAISED
ALISOV REPPYt
I. INTRODUCTION
THREE hundred and fifteen years ago, on August 12, 1645, a man
of obvious distinction, yet whose countenance revealed a state of
grave anxiety and depression, stood on the dock in the Harbor of Stock-
holm, Sweden, ready to take passage in a vessel, which had been assigned
by Queen Christiana to carry him to Lubeck. The departure was made
in view of a large assembly, among which were distinguished members
of the Royal Court, gathered to do honor to the great statesman who
had so long and faithfully served as Swedish Ambassador to France.
Shortly after clearing the port, the ship was overtaken by a violent
storm, which continued to rage with unremitting fury for four long and
turbulent days as if to demonstrate the freedom of the seas by tossing
both the ship and its celebrated passenger upon its wild and unknown
waves. Finally cast ashore on the Pomeranian coast, within a few
miles of Dantzig, there to live or to die, as God should will, within sight of
the ocean's heaving billows, within sound of its manifold voices, this
lonely individual, now ill and in a weakened condition, was forced to
travel for a distance of sixty miles in an open, springless cart, over un-
speakable roads, in a continuing wind and rain, arriving in Rostock, on the
twenty-sixth day of August, weary and spent beyond repair. Unable to
continue further on his journey, the destination of which was then and
even now remains unknown, a physician and a minister of the gospel
were called in to prescribe for the last physical and spiritual needs of
this stranger in a strange land, who only two days later, in the early
morning hours of August twenty-ninth, passed to that land from which
no man returneth. And so he, who in life had stirred millions by the
influence of his ideas, and who, after death was to move generations and
even nations by the intellectual and spiritual force of his arguments,
died in a deserted and lonely spot, far removed from Kith and Kin,
in an atmosphere of unutterable misery and gloom, all of which was
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overshadowed with a complete sense of failure, as evidenced by his
dying words: "By undertaking many things I have accomplished
nothing." After religious ceremonies were concluded in Rostock, his
mortal remains were removed to Delft and there quietly buried in the
Nieue Kirche in the tomb of his ancestors, upon which is inscribed an
epitaph, written by himself, doubtless in a bitter hour of disillusion-
ment and despair. It reads:
"This is Hugo Grotius, captive and exile of the Dutch, Ambassador of the Great
Realm of Sweden."'
In 1608, or thirty-seven years prior to his untimely death in exile,
Hugo Grotius, then Attorney-General of the Dutch Republic, ordered
the anonymous publication of a book under the title, Mare Liberum, in
which he expounded his theory of the freedom of the seas, or the right
of the Dutch to participate in the East Indian Trade.' In this famous
book, which the author was then unwilling publicly to acknowledge,
but which he evidently deemed important, because it was addressed "To
the rulers and to the free and independent nations of Christendom,"
Grotius, contrary to prior theory and practice, asserted that by the Law
of Nations navigation was free to all persons whatsoever. Marshalling
his arguments under the subjects of navigation, ownership of the sea,
and the right to trade, he denied the Portuguese the right to title by
discovery, by occupation, by papal gift or by war, and concluded there-
fore that the Dutch had, as against the Portuguese, the right to trade
freely with the East Indies and, if necessary, in order to do so, wage
war, which could be justified as legitimate under the principles of the
law of nations.
While the doctrine of Mare Liberum was neither immediately nor
fully accepted, some two hundred years after its appearance, in the case
of "Le Louis,"' Lord Stowell rejected England's claim to the exercise
of jurisdiction beyond a marine league from the British shore, basing
his conclusion on two fundamental principles of public law: one, that
there is perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states;
and two, that all nations being equal, all have an equal right to the
uninterrupted use of unappropriated parts of the ocean for their naviga-
tion. And since that time there has been little disposition to question
1. "Grotius hic Hugo est, Batavum captivus et exul, Legatus regnz, Suecia magna, tid."
KNiGHT, Tn' LiPF AND WORKsS or Huco GROTIUs 289 (1925). For a further discussion,
see id., at 267-89.
2. GROTnus, THE FREEDOm Or THE SEAS (1916). Translated with a Revision of the Latin
Text of 1633 by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, and Edited with an Introductory Note
by James Brown Scott.
3. 2 Dods. 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817).
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the validity of the Grotian doctrine, as thus approved in such sweeping
terms.
Recently, however, there has developed a tendency to take a more
realistic attitude as to the total validity of this doctrine. Thus, in the
Declaration of Panama,4 made immediately upon the outbreak of
World War II, the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics de-
clared, that as a measure of self-protection, they were inherently entitled
to prohibit all belligerent action in waters extending several hundred
miles from the shore. And the domestic difference of opinion between
the United States and the States of California, Louisiana and Texas' has
called attention to the conflicting claims to title to the natural resources
lying under the continental shelf, which in turn, raises a disturbing issue
as to how far such shelf and land extends into the sea.
Such problems as these, recurring with increasing frequency, not to
mention the implications of the atomic or hydrogen bomb, suggest that
the time is at hand when the basis of the original doctrine of freedom
of the seas should be reexamined and reappraised. As a background for
such reappraisal, let us together quickly glance back over the pages of
history in order to observe what has been the law and practice of
nations with respect to the dominion of the sea, prior to the age of
Grotius, to note the occasion and peculiar circumstances under which
the Grotian freedom of the seas doctrine was originally proclaimed, to
take notice of how, in the intervening years, the new theory has actually
worked in practice, what its present status is in the light of modern
developments in peace and war, and finally, what are its prospects in
the immediate future.
II. THE EAIPIRE OF THE SEA AS VIEWED IN THE HOLY WRIT, BY THE
ANCIENT STATES, BY THE MODERN STATES BEFORE THE DIScOVERY
OF AIERICA, AND BY THE MODERN STATES AFTER THE Dis-
COVERY OF AMERICA, UNDER THE LAW OF NATURE
AND THE LAW QF NATIONS
A. THE DOMINION OF THE SEA
As Grotius addressed his celebrated book, Mare Liberum, "to the free
and independent nations of Christendom," it seems not unreasonable
first to inquire as to whether the doctrine that the sea is susceptible to
private dominion and propriety within the meaning of sacred history as
set out in the Holy Scriptures.
4. 1 DEP'T STATE BULL. 331 (1939).
5. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U. S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950).
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(1) As Viewed in the Holy Scriptures.-According to the Holy Writ,
the people of Biblical times recognized that a state might have not only
dominion of the sea, but also the right to fish in the sea. Thus, in
Genesis, man is directed to "Replenish the Earth and subdue it, and have
Dominion over the Fish of the Sea .... -I Also in Genesis, it is said:
"The Fear of you, and the Dread of you [which are terms implying
dominion] shall be upon all the Beasts of the Earth and upon every
Fowl of the Air, and upon all that moveth upon Earth, and upon all
the Fishes of the Sea. . . ."I By these words, dominion over field, air
and sea, were given to the sons of men and their posterity in general.
It remained for mankind to make use of the land and sea to satisfy its
own needs.8 The dominion of the sea thus recognized by the Holy Writ,
was recognized and put into practical application by the Phoenecians,
whose sovereignty was actually set forth in Ezekiel, in the following
language: "Then all the Princes of the Sea shall come down from their
Thrones .... and they shall take up a Lamentation for thee. How art
thou destroy'd, that wast inhabited of the Sea, the renowned City
[Tyre], which wast strong in the Sea, she and her Inhabitants which
cause their Terror [Dominion] to be upon all that haunt the Sea."'
Clearly, sovereignty is here implied. The "renowned city" referred to
was the ancient city of Tyre, made strong and rich by her commerce, as
observed by Isaias, who said, "The Harvest of the River is her Reve-
nue."'10 Moreover, again referring to Tyre, the prophet remarks that
"The Sea has spoken even the Strength of the Sea."" And by the Psalm-
ist it is declared that "I will set his Hand also in the Sea, and his Right
Hand in the Rivers,"' by which, according to Ebon Ezra, the Dominion
of the Waters was assigned to King David, as the ruler of all who sailed
therein. The same theme also finds support in a passage in Esther, which
reads: "And the King Assuerus laid a tribute upon the Land, and upon
the Isles of the Sea,' 3 from which it appears that the King was both
6. C. i, v. 28.
7. C. ix, v. 2.
8. Nor was that passage of Scripture found in Psalms, 113, v. 16, presented by those
opposed to the verses in Genesis, and which read: "The Heavens, of the Heaven is the
Lord's, but the Earth hath been given to the Children of Men," in contradiction, because
of its failure to mention the sea. The theory was that the Almighty reserved this juris-
diction to Himself. Such an implication is not only unnecessary but is contradicted by
the Holy Scriptures. JvsTIcE, A GENERAL TREATISE or THE DoMINION Or TnE SEA 12
(2d ed. 1702).
9. C. xxvi, v. 16, 17.
10. C. xxiii, v. 3.
11. C. xxiii, v. 4.
12. PsA-M, 88, 26.
13. C. 10, v. 1.
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lord of the sea and islands, upon which he had the power to impose a
tribute. The views thus expressed also find confirmation in the Apocry-
phal Texts,' 4 and in the comments of the Jewish Rabbis in the 34th
Chapter of Numbers, to the effect that the boundaries of Canaan include
the sea. Thus, according to the Holy Writ, it is clear that the sea was
regarded as susceptible of being brought under dominion, the only issue
being not the extent but the nature of the dominion.
(2) As Viewed by the Ancient States.-Among the earliest states which
have claimed the empire of the sea, may be listed Tyre, the home of the
Phoenecians; 1' the inhabitants of the Aegina Island, located in the Gulf
of Salamis;' Crete, under King Minos;' 7 the Rhodian people, who
framed the laws of the sea;' 8 Persia, under Darius, who met defeat on
14. 1 Boor or ESDRAS C. 4; 2 Boor or ESDRAS c. 7.
15. They were among the earliest builders and navigators of armed ships, who mas-
tered the Mediterranean, and passed beyond the columns of Hercules to discover Great
Britain and to claim the Atlantic in gratification of their boundless ambition. Having ac-
quired dominion of the sea over the immense area controlled by the great monarchs of
Asia and India, and also Egypt, the masters became tyrants, exercising piracy and op-
pressing the peoples subject to their control. Finally, opposition developed which resulted
in the seige and fall of Tyre at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, King of the Babylonians,
who in the year 580 B.C., exterminated the people and destroyed the city to its founda-
tions, and with it their empire of the sea, thus fulfilling Ezekiel's sad prophecy of doom,
to which we referred in discussing property rights of the sea as viewed by the Holy Scrip-
tures. See Eusarus n- CnaoaRc. lib. 2; 1 AzuNr, Tim M mnx= LAw or Eunor 25-9
(1806); JusrcF, op. cit. 4upra note 8, at 12.
16. These inhabitants, credited by Hesoid as the inventors of the art of navigation, in
the, struggle against the Persians, established themselves as the masters of the Eastern
Seas, not long before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Feeling their strength the
Aeginetae insulted the Athenians, caused them to increase their naval strength, so that, ac-
cording to Eusebius (EusEBrus ni CunoNic lib. 2) and Strabo (Snmuo, GEoocsnnv lib.
16), after the Aegean Island had exercised from ten to twenty years of sovereignty over
the Eastern Sea, the Athenians during the time of Pericles, destroyed their naval power,
annihilated their commerce, and drove them from the island. Consult on this topic,
I Azumr, op. cit. supra note 15, at 29-36; JusicE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 20.
17. The inhabitants of the island of Crete, later known as Candia, exerted a large
dominion over the neighboring seas, including a great part of the Aegean Sea (T cuvmns,
HisToRy lib. 1), which lasted approximately one hundred and seventy-five years. After
the abolition of the Cretan monarchy, disunity developed, and piratical expeditions in-
fested the Mediterranean, harassed navigation up to the very coasts of Italy, thus invok-
ing an attack by the Romans upon their native island, then completely independent,
which attack resulted in changing the government of Crete, and reducing it to one among
many provinces of the Roman Empire. See 1 Azui-r, op. cit. Tupra note 15, at 30; JUsrIcr,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 16. The Ottomans succeeded the Romans in controlling the islands
in the Cretan seas.
18. According to Eusebius the Rhodian people held dominion of the sea for twenty-
three years, during which period they acted as protectors of the nations which others might
have enslaved. They gained immortality as the framers of the laws of the sea, pronounced
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land at Marathon, and on sea at Salamis;'0 Greece, by reason of its
geographical position in relation to the Propontis, the Aegean and Ionian
Seas, the Corinthian Gulf and the nearby islands;2" Macedonia, under
the successive leadership of Philip and Alexander the Great; 21 Egypt,
master of the Red Sea as far as India; Carthage, built on the ruins of
by Constantine Hermenopolus (PROcHIR. JUIUs lib. 12, tit. 11) as the most ancient then
extant. These laws were subsequently recognized by the Romans from the time of
Tiberius (See Jus GRAECOROMANUUar tom. II, p. 265) and ultimately found a place
in the Justinian Digests, where they served for the maritime law of the nations
bordering on the shores of the Mediterranean. Finally taken over by the Romans, their
laws of the sea were adopted, in accordance with the Roman policy of adopting what-
ever was found excellent among foreign nations. For a more detailed account of the
Rhodian dominion of the sea, see 1 AzuNi, op. cit. supra note 15, at 31-4; JusTICE, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 17.
19. After Darius was defeated at Marathon, Xerxes sought to wrest the control of
the sea from Greece, but met disaster in the naval battle of Salamis, where the Persian
maritime forces were overthrown, leaving Greece, the freest nation of the world at that
time, exercising a despotism over the sea, to which the most absolute monarch of tile
period was forced to do homage. Thus, the battle of Salamis, followed by the battles of
Plataea and Mycale, destroyed Persian power, delivering from their yoke Cyprus, Thrace,
Macedonia and the Chessonesus. 1 AzuNi, op. cit. supra note 15, at 34-6.
20. Greece, of necessity, became a maritime nation, and after her brilliant victory
over the Persians, resolved to maintain their mastery of the sea. In this she was success-
ful during the time of Themistocles. Under the leadership of Aristides, we find that she
gained a temporary victory over the Lacedemonians, who had previously laid claim to
the mastery of the sea. Subsequently, although threatened by the rival Republic of Lace-
demonia, the Athenians exposed themselves by a disastrous attack upon Sicily, and In
their weakened state were set upon, their remaining fleet destroyed, and Athens, their
capital, demolished, thus giving the Lacedemonians an absolute despotism over the
Mediterranean Sea. Ten years later Conon defeated the Lacedemonians at the battle of
Gnidos, after which dominance of the Eastern Mediterranean Seas was abandoned to Mace-
donia. 1 AzuNi, op. cit. supra note 15, at 36-40; JusTicE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 20-2.
21. Philip sought to erect an Empire upon the ruins of his Grecian neighbors. As an
incident of this policy he created a marine force under the pretext of suppressing piracy
in the Aegean and Ionian Seas. Philip's violent death at a time when he was preparing
to invade Persia, and regarded himself as conqueror of Asia and the ruler of the sea,
left his son, Alexander the Great, in a very advantageous position. Accepting that which
Philip gave him, he found new projects of his own, and swept on to world conquest.
Not forgetting that success turned on commerce and a well established marine, he de-
stroyed Tyre, threatened Carthage, and founded Alexandria as the capital of what was to
be a universal empire over both land and sea, located centrally between Tyre and Car-
thage, for purposes of controlling communication between India and Ethiopia by the Red
Sea and the Nile on one hand, and on the other hand between Europe and Africa by
the Mediterranean, thus drawing to itself the commerce of both areas. But all these
brilliant plans of Alexander for world conquest and continued dominance of the sea, were
cut off by his unexpected and untimely death. 1 Azuuz, op. cit. supra note 15, at 40-2.
22. Egypt, by reason of its geographical and topographical aspects, was originally not
induced to make navigation a principal industry. But Sesostris, who reigned in Egypt
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Tyre;' and Rome, whose supremacy over the seas was established as
an incident of its conquest of Carthage and was to continue until the
fall of the empire, after which all claim of dominion over the sea ceased
until a new power arose capable of asserting and maintaining it.-"
1,659 years before the Christian era, discovered the advantages of commerce with India,
established a marine and became master of the Red Sea, as far as India. Upon the death
of Alexander the Great, Egypt fell to Ptolemy, who encouraged the development of
Alexandria and revived intercourse with India, which had been interrupted at the time
of the death of Sesostris. Ptolemy-Philadelphus established control over both the Red
Sea and the Mediterranean, which supremacy was maintained until the time of the twelfth
Ptolemy, called Dionysius, who lost his empire when Caesar laid seige to Alexandria. (See
CAnsAR, DE B=LL. Crv. lib. 3). Although the maritime power of Egypt was revived by
Cleopatra to such an extent as to be of aid to Anthony in his war against Augustus, Egypt
was reduced to the position of one among many Roman Provinces after the battle of
Actium, with the control of its marine power passing into the hands of the Romans. 1
AzuN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 42-8.
23. With the fall of Egypt the control of the Mediterranean passed to Carthage and
Rome. Carthage, built on the ruins of Tyre, became the proud rival of Rome, disputing
with her the mastery of the world. Inspired by avarice and greed for wealth, Carthage
acquired control over all the coasts of Africa, Sicily and Sardinia, and ruled with tyrannic
sway over the Mediterranean up to the very gates of Gibraltar. Foreigners were per-
mitted only a five-day in Sardinia and the Romans were prohibited from washing their
bands in the Sicilian Sea. The sway of Carthage was substantially uninterrupted, except
for some opposition from Agathocles, the King of Sicily, until the beginning of the First
Punic War, when the Romans refused subjection to them at sea. Prior to that time the
Romans, by the first treaty concluded with the Carthagenians, had surrendered their sov-
ereignty of the sea. It had been agreed "that neither the Romans, nor their confederates
should sail beyond the fair Promontory, unless they should be driven thither by Tempests
or Enemies." In the second treaty at the close of the First Punic War Polybius states:
"That no Roman should so much as touch either upon Africa or Sardinia, except it were
either to take in Provisions or repair their ships." At the close of the Second Punic War,
which resulted in Carthage being forced to submit to the Romans, who were victorious
at sea and on land, the dominion of the sea passed from their hands. At the end of the
Third Punic War, not only the last fleet of Carthage was destroyed, but also the City of
Carthage itself, and thus vanished their mastery of the sea forever. Jus'rxcc op. cit. supra
note 8, at 23.
24. Having established its naval supremacy as an incident of the conquest of Carthage,
Rome sought at all times to maintain dominion of the sea by keeping a powerful fleet
available to suppress piracy or to assert her sovereignty. At the end of the Second Punie
War, Scipio, the Conqueror of Hannibal in Africa, granted peace only on condition that
Carthage should keep ten ships, delivering up the remainder to the Romans. The fall of
Carthage at the close of the Third Punic War established Rome as the masters of the
seas, with control over all Africa. Subsequently, under Caesar the Romans entered the
Atlantic, passed over to England, and became sovereigns over most of the known seas.
Under Augustus, after Caesar's assassination, three fleets were maintained, one to keep
in awe the coasts of Spain, one to protect the Etrurian Sea, the Islands of Sicily, Sardinia
and Caicos, and another, to secure the control of the Adriatic Sea. Thereafter, the naval
power of Rome declined, but was again revived under Trajan, who established his empire
of the sea as far as the Red Sea in one direction and as far as England in the other.
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(3) As Viewed by Modern States Prior to the Discovery of America.
After the barbarians, the first modern state prior to the discovery of
America to claim dominion of the sea was the Republic of Venice which
asserted sovereignty over the Adriatic." Genoa, as a result of her victory
over the Venetians, Pisans and Saracens, also pretended to dominion
of the sea, extending her power to the Aegean, Euxine, Syria and
Palestine."6 At one time Pisa,2" the Goths, Vandals, Saracens and Nor-
Succeeding emperors permitted the marine to fall into decay, and when the barbarians
overran the Empire, the Empire's power was broken both on land and at sea. (PoLvyaus
lib. 1, c. 3). 1 Azum, op. cit. supra note 15, at 54-76.
25. Situated at the bottom of this sea, Venice, from the beginning, encouraged com-
merce, and built up her strength at sea which gradually enabled her to assert and main-
tain sovereignty and impose a tax upon all who sailed in the Adriatic Sea. This practice
having been complained of to the Pope by the inhabitants of Ancona, the complaint only
resulted in the confirmation of the practice by Gregory ,X, as essential to support the
marines employed against the pirates and Saracens. At even an earlier period the pre-
ponderance of the Venetians over the Adriatic Sea resulted in 1177 in a grant by Pope
Alexander III of the sovereignty of the sea. Riding on the tide of victory the Venetians
took Cyprus, Marea, Candia; they became masters of Constantinople, Naples, Sicily and
a large part of Italy. The Crusades they used as a source of added wealth; they triumphed
over the Greeks, the Saracens, the Pisans, the Genoese, the Dukes of Milan, the Turks and
the English. Their conquests created jealousy, which Pope Julius II took advantage of
in 1509 to recover several Italian cities and to organize a league against them. By pro-
moting dissension among the opposition and by a lavish use of gold, Venice escaped this
danger, only to fall a victim of the Portuguese, who suddenly appeared after a voyage
around the Cape of Good Hope. As a result of this development the commerce, in which
the Venetians had engaged with the East Indies through the Red Sea and with Egypt and
the maritime cities of Asia, was lost. Lacking these resources, Venice ceased to assert mas-
tery of the sea. JUsTicE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 25-7. The story of how the Pope con-
ferred on the Venetians the sovereignty of the Adriatic Sea constitutes an interesting side-
light on the developments of this period. It appeared that Pope Alexander III, persecuted
by Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, had taken refuge in Venice, where he was accorded the
honors due his position. A naval battle between the forces of the Emperor and Venice
off the coast of Istria resulted in a victory for the Venetians. In appreciation of this out-
come, the Pope met the victorious leader of the Venetian fleet, and to immortalize the
triumph, presented him with his ring with these words: "Use this as a chain, to hold the
waves in subjection to the empire of Venice; with this ring espouse the sea, and hereafter,
on the same day, in every year, let the celebration of this marriage be renewed by
you and your successors. By this ceremony, posterity will learn, that your arms have
acquired the vast dominion of the waves, and that the sea is subjected to you, as the
wife to her husband." By reason of this incident, the ceremony performed yearly at
Venice on the day of the Ascension, continues even unto this day. 1 Az NI, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 78; JusncE, op. cit. supra note 8, 25-7.
26. Genoa seized Cappa, on the coast of the Cimerian Bosphorus, and also parts of
Cyprus, Mytilene and Galata, opposite Constantinople. Half of Sardinia, and the islands
of Corsica and Caprara, belonged to the Genoese. Thus fortified, Genoa carried on com-
merce with India across the northern part of Asia and the deserts of Arabia by the Per-
sian Gulf, the Tigris and Euphrates, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, thus emulating
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mans,I and finally the Crusaders, 9 held sway.
(4) As Viewed by the Modern States After the Discovery of the New
World and Prior to the Promulgation of the Grotian Theory of the Free-
dom of the Seas.--The discovery of the magnetic needle, which suggested
the mariner's compass, attributed to the French, led to the opening of
a new route to India by the Atlantic Ocean, and to the discovery of
America.30 Thereafter, inspired by the prospect of gold and silver, and
other forms of wealth, in turn Portugal, Spain, Holland, England and
France, made discoveries in the new world, and sought to retain exclusive
possession of their respective discoveries, as an incident of which they
asserted and made every effort to maintain exclusive control of the seas.
a. Portugal.--Of these states, Portugal stands out as the most effective
advocate of the doctrine of the lawfulness of a dominion and propriety
in the sea, as appears by the title of their King, in the preface to the
Laws of Portugal, wherein he pretends to be sole Lord of Navigation
and Trade in Ethiopia, Arabia and India.l With such theories in mind,
the earlier Greek empire. Celebrated as navigators, the Genoese held the empire of
the sea for a long period, their power, like that of the Venetians, being finally annihilated
because of continuing rivalships among the Mediterranean states, in the light of a shift of
power as a result of the discovery of the Western Hemisphere by Christopher Columbus, an
enterprising Genoese. Now that all maritime developments were directed to the Atlantic
Ocean, Italy ceased to be the commercial center of the world. 1 Azzm, op. cit. supra note
15, at 83-5; jusricF, op. cit. supra note 8, at 27.
27. When the Roman Empire was subverted, Pisa, like several other Italian cities,
became a republic. By means of the Arno, which served as a port and offered a shelter
from pirates and storms, she soon became a formidable maritime power with such numer-
ous fleets as to make her mistress of the sea. In 1267 the Pope advised Henry, brother
of the King of Castile, who desired to conquer Sardinia, to desist as he would have to
overcome the Pisans. Alternately on the side of the Pope and that of the Emperor in the
disputes of the Guelphs and Ghibbelines, Pisa was weakened and subsequently its naval
power suffered a severe blow at the hands of the Venetians from which it never recovered.
1 Azumr op. cit. supra note 15, at 85-9.
28. Following the downfall of the Roman Empire, these peoples overran Europe, and
for a short period exercised a momentary empire of the sea, which extended no further
than the coasts of Africa, Sardinia and Spain. After the Saracens, the Normans infested
the coasts of Britain and France, finally settling down in Normandy, from whence they
cruised along the coasts of Spain, passed through Gibraltar, and conquered Naples and
Sicily. I Azxr, op. cit. supra note 15, at 90.
29. The period of the Crusaders, during which nine attempts were made to save the
Holy Land from the Turks, resulting in as many disasters, nevertheless gave the fleets
of the Crusaders a temporary preponderance in the Mediterranean which vanished when
the Crusades ended. 1 Azum, op. cit. supra note 15, at 91.
30. See 1 Azuxr op. cit. supra note 15, at 93.
31. In the Body of the Laws of Portugal, this doctrine is more positively stated in
the form of an absolute prohibition to any person whether native or stranger in any
ship or vessel "to pass to the Countries, Lands and Seas of Guinea and the Indies,
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it is not surprising to find the Portuguese making the ocean an avenue
of conquest. Henry, son of John I of Portugal, conceiving the idea of
trading on the coasts of Africa, instituted the study of astronomy and
erected an observatory, which led to the invention of the Astrolabe.
Making first use of the compass, pilots under his direction discovered
the Island of Maderia in 1419. John II, son of Henry, also using the
compass, rediscovered the Cape of Good Hope, 2 opening up a new pas-
sage to the East Indies. In 1497, King Emanuel, prosecuting the schemes
of his predecessor, sent a squadron of four vessels under the command
of that intrepid sailor, Vasco de Gama, who, after running along the
Eastern coast of Africa, discovered Indostan. Profiting greatly from
these various discoveries, Emanuel, in 1505, dispatched Francis Alameyda
to India, for the purpose of setting up a permanent establishment under
a Viceroy. Equipped with a fleet of twenty-two ships, he met and defeated
a fleet composed of ships of the King of Calicut, leagued with the Arabs
and Egyptians. The son of Alameyda, directed to cut off Arabian ships
from the Maluccas, discovered the Island of Ceylon and took possession
of it in the name of the King. In 1508, a new fleet enroute to India dis-
covered Madagascar and on its arrival in India consolidated the Portu-
guese positions, leaving Albuquerque, who became Viceroy upon Ala-
meyda's death. In subsequent years, he laid the foundation of the
Portuguese empire in 'India and extended its glories to the extremities
of the earth, only to be recalled finally as a result of the envy of his
enemies. As Portugal and Spain were near neighbors, their respective
discoveries brought on dissensions. Thus a dispute over the Canary
Islands arose between Don Alphonso, King of Portugal, and Ferdinand
and Isabella. The issue was settled by compromise, under which the
Portuguese were given the Azores, Guinea, and Western Ethiopia, which
convention was confirmed by subsequent Papal Bulls. 3 A further dis-
pute developed as an incident of the memorable Bull of Pope Alexander
VI in which he made the King of Spain a gift of nothing less than the
newly discovered Western World. "The bounds therein were on this
side of an imaginary line drawn from the Arctic to the Antarctic Poles;
either upon occasion of War or Commerce, or for any other Reason whatsoever, without
the King of Portugal's special License and Authority, under pain of Death and Confisca-
tion of all Effects, to be inflicted upon all such Persons as should presume to go
thither to Contempt of the said Prohibition." DUNTO LiBRO DES ORDENNACONNES tit. 112; Jus-
TrCE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 29.
32. It had been thought that Hanno, under Carthagian sponsorship, had made the
discovery at an earlier period. ARNOULD, SYSTEm, narit. et polit. c. 2.
33. "Pope Sextus IV, by his letters, dated at Rome, the l1th of the calends of July,
confirmed this treaty as well as the bulls of Martin V, Eugene IV, and Nicholas V."
1 AzuNri, op. cit. supra note 15, at 100.
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which line was to be distant from each of the Islands called the Azores and
Cape Verde, one hundred leagues towards the West and South: All
that was Eastward fell to the Share of the Portuguese, all that was West-
ward to the Spaniards."34 It appeared that Sebastian Cano, having
arrived at the Maluccas, by a short route discovered by him and Magel-
lan, suggested to Charles V that the islands should belong to him, as the
Portuguese had not penetrated to them, and since they fell within the
area belonging to him under the division of Pope Alexander VI. Such
reasons seemed highly unjust to King John III of Portugal, who in the
ensuing struggle, gained possession of the Maluccas, notwithstanding
the Papal Bull. In 1581, Portuguese dominion of the sea was terminated
when they submitted to the Spanish yoke. From then on her activities
were restricted, though not, as we shall see, entirely eliminated.
b. Spain.--Prior to the reign of Ferdinand V, Spain was not an im-
portant factor in marine affairs. But the marriage of Ferdinand to
Isabella, united the Crowns of Castile, Leon, Arragon, Navarre and
Granada, gave him a predominant position in Europe and caused him
to look upon the sea as a new empire and as a medium for acquiring
new Kingdoms. In 1446 his first maritime expedition reduced the Canary
Islands. In the same year, another fleet, dispatched to Guinea, returned
laden with riches, only to be captured by the Portuguese, then at war
with Spain. In 1484, Gonsalvo Hernandez Cordova aided the King of
Naples and recovered Calabria for the French. These first efforts of
Ferdinand opened up the way for new discoveries. While the Portuguese
were occupied along the coasts of Africa and Asia, the Spanish discovered
America, and as an incident thereof discovered and conquered the West
Indies. Columbus reached San Salvador on October 11, 1492; in 1497,
Americus Vespucius, a Florentine, sailing in a subordinate capacity in
a squadron commanded by Alonso de Ojeda, wrote of the new land, and
as a consequence the newly discovered country bears his name. In 1518
Cortez and in 1525 Pizzaro extended Spain's conquests in the New World,
and in the succeeding years the continued activity of the Spanish fleet
established Spain on the coasts of Africa, in the Canary's and the Indies,
and transferred the empire of the Indian Seas to Spain. Then it was that
Ferdinand, following the earlier example of the Portuguese, sought and
obtained the Papal Bull from Alexander VI, which was issued at Rome
on May 2, 1493, and which assigned to these states their respective
spheres of sovereignty over the seas. By authority of this Bull, Ferdi-
nand became possessed of the legal property in the seas and Kingdoms
of the two Indies, and now turned his attention to the Barbary pirates
who ravaged the coasts of Spain, taking refuge in the Harbor of Oran.
34. JrsicE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 3.
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In quick succession a fleet subdued Oran, while another defeated the
Venetians, thus giving the Spanish a great preponderance in the Mediter-
ranean. In 1535, Charles V of Austria, who had succeeded Ferdinand,
thus uniting the Crown of Spain with the Germanic Empire, successfully
resisted the effort of Barbarossa to seize the Kingdom of Tunis. In
1540, a similar effort to seize Algeria came to grief as the result of a ter-
rific storm, with the loss of one hundred and fifty ships. Philip II, son
of Charles, was equally unsuccessful against the Barbary powers. In
the meantime, the Dutch had shaken off the Spanish yoke, with the aid
of Queen Elizabeth. Furious with indignation, Philip forgot his troubles
in the Mediterranean, and now undertook the conquest of England. Over
a three year period he concentrated all the ships' carpenters of Spain,
Portugal, and of Naples and Sicily, which then belonged to Spain, in a
unified effort to build a fleet of tremendous size and force. This fleet,
which put to sea in 1588, known as the Invincible Armada, consisted
of one hundred and thirty ships, one hundred of which were the largest
ever to appear on the ocean. It also had twenty caravels or light ships,
which followed the fleet, maneuvering under its wings. The ships in this
fleet were too large to be skilfully maneuvered, they were manned with
poorly trained sailors, and were under the leadership of the Duke de
Medina-Sidonia, who lacked both energy and practical experience.
Counting on these weaknesses, the English avoided being boarded, used
their artillery effectively, burned and took many ships and disabled the
remainder. A storm which arose during the battle drove a number of
the Spanish ships on the Scottish and Irish Coasts, where they were
taken or sunk. Of the entire fleet only about twenty ships returned to
Spain. Such a defeat naturally caused the mastery of the sea to pass
to other handsY5
c. Holland.-This was the situation when the decay of the Spanish
mastery of the sea saw the Dutch, after many years of oppression as a
Spanish colony, proclaim their independence in 1581, just seven years
prior to the destruction of the Spanish Armada by the English."0 Inde-
pendence was not undisputed by Spain. After a long contest, in 1609,
a truce which lasted for twelve years was finally declared. Having thus
thrown off the Spanish yoke and established a federal republic, stimulated
by a desire for revenge against their former oppressors who, while still
strong, were now definitely on the decline, the Dutch commenced pri-
vateering, formed a marine and sought riches in trade, at the expense
of the Spanish, whom they everywhere defeated, and of the Portuguese,
35. 1 AzuNI, op. cit. supra note 15, at 103-13.
36. PLOETrz, MANUAL OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY 331 (1911).
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whom they detested.3" This .development went unopposed by England
and France, which saw in the rise of the new republic nothing but the
humiliation of the Spanish Crown. Accordingly, at first they assisted
the Dutch in preserving their conquests and spoils, not then fully realizing
their value. This course of action by the Dutch necessarily brought
them into direct conflict with Portugal and Spain, which as yet claimed
exclusive control of the respective areas assigned in 1493 by the Bull
of Alexander VI, who, incidentally, was a Spaniard. Not yet having
acquired a mastery of the seas, yet desiring to take advantage of peace-
ful trade as well as the profits of privateering, the Dutch were naturally
inclined to favor the community of the seas doctrine,"8 which as of that
time was directly contrary to the doctrine of the empire of the seas as
followed by the ancient states, the modern states, which claimed dominion
of the sea prior to the discovery of America, the Crusaders, and finally,
those states, which, after 1492, asserted empires of the sea, to wit, Portu-
gal and Spain. England, as the victor over the Invincible Armada of
Spain, was just emerging as a sea power, and as yet in the main was
content to limit her jurisdiction to the territorial seas. In the meantime,
the discovery of America, now almost a century in the past, with the
Spaniards claiming possession because of its discovery and settlement,
followed by their inhumane treatment of the natives both in war and
peace, had led in Spain as well as abroad to a discussion of the principles
of war upon which their claims and their actions might be justifiedY0
B. STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE AS TO THE DOMINION OF THE SEA AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Such then, was the status of world affairs, when in 1598, the trade of
the Dutch in the East Indies began, in opposition to the Portuguese and
Spanish,4" soon deteriorating into a series of privateering if not down-
right piratical practices, resulting in the capture of prizes, the title or
legality of which could only be settled by a determination of, whether
the Dutch, under the existing theories as to the dominion of the sea,
had a right to act as they had acted in the past and intended to act
37. 1 Azumr op. cit. supra note 15, at 113-18.
38. J sTim, op. cit. supra note 8, at 32.
39. For the developments along this line in Spain, see Scon', Tin SPA.s Oa=cm or
IxTErAT NAL LAW (1928), in which the contributions of Francisco de Vitoria (14SO-
1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) to the development of an organized system of
international law are admirably and succinctly set forth.
40. 'We are between the discovery of America on the one hand, and the ending of
the Spanish wars in Holland and Belgium, on the other; and in the interval between those
two periods, the modem school of international law came into being, to meet the modern
needs of nations." ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 39, at 20.
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in the future. The determination of this question not only raised once
again in most acute form the issue of the ancient doctrine of the mastery
of the sea but also necessitated the formulation of the rules of inter-
national law which were to govern nations in both peace and war.
III. THE JOINT-STOCK CORPORATION, HUGO GROTIUS, AND THE OCCA-
SION AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE DOCTRINE OF
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS WAS FORMULATED
More specifically then, what was the immediate occasion and the
particular circumstances which impelled Grotius to formulate and, after
a considerable period of hesitation, finally publish his revolutionary theory
as to the empire of the seas? The answer to this question is neither easy
nor short, but is to be found in a combination of factors which will ap-
pear as the story unfolds.
With the return of the first Dutch fleet from the East Indies in late
1597, the route to this commercial area had been discovered and opened
up. But the situation was fraught with potential difficulty, as the Portu-
guese regarded any attempt to trade in the Indies or to carry on traffic
with the natives as a direct infringement upon their established rights.
In opposing such encroachments they at first resorted to cunning which,
proving of no avail, was followed by the use of force. In the ensuing
struggle now barely beginning Dutch merchants and masters were treated
as pirates. At first the Dutch, long on a friendly basis with Portugal, were
reluctant to take up war. But gradually purely defensive measures
necessarily turned into aggressive action, as a result of which Dutch
sailors sometimes overstepped their instructions, attacked the enemy,
and wreaked their vengeance but failed to recoup their losses, as the
treasures of the Portuguese were carried in large ships, which avoided
hostilities and sought only to reach the home port safely. For a few
years this remained the status of affairs. But as each returning ship
brought new tidings of violence on the part of the enemy, rancor added
to self-interest created a determination among Dutch merchants and
sailors to meet these aggressive tactics with superior force.41
A. THE JOINT-STOCK CORPORATION, GROTIUS AND THE PRIZES SEIZED
AS AN INCIDENT OF TRADE IN THE EAST INDIES.-But a few individual ship-
owners were powerless to supply this superior force. This was not only un-
derstood by these men, but it was fully appreciated by the government
and the lawyers of the States-General. At this point, therefore, the
41. Fruin, An Unpublished Work of Hugo Grotius, in 5 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 8-10
(1925).
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joint-stock corporation appeared upon the scene, in the form of the United
East Indies Company, which was composed of several smaller companies,
operating under an exclusive patent for trading with the Indies, founding
Dutch power, constructing fortresses, recruiting soldiers, and making
treaties. Authority was not given to capture prizes, but the undeclared
design of the organization was to weaken the enemy, and how else could
this be done except by destroying his trade and seizing his wealth. Even
before the United Company was organized in 1602, ships sent out by
Zealand ship-owners, subsequently included in the Company, had seized
and brought in a Portuguese vessel as a result of a fight begun by the
Dutch-a clearly illegal act. This occurred in Mlay of 1602, and in
October of the same year another prize was seized in violation of the
master's instructions. Shortly, however, all pretense was discarded, and
we find the government itself ordering the directors of the Company to
instruct their admirals and captains "to damage the enemy in the Indies,
their persons, Vessels and goods in all possible ways."' In such an atmos-
phere not unnaturally, we find the directors, in cooperation with the
deputies of the States-General, secretly ordering one who was sailing
with twelve ships in December, 1603, "to greatly damage the enemy,
bbth by water and land." According to Fruin, that instruction marked
the "turning point in the history of the trade with the Indies. From this
moment the United Company ceases to be a mere trading company;
it becomes a Power waging war and in the Indies it represents the Re-
public in the fullness of its authority."4
The two prizes mentioned earlier were taken by the Zealanders. But
now one, Captain Heemskerck, representing a company which was sub-
sequently incorporated in the United Company, captured the large Portu-
guese galleon, the Catherina, loaded with a fabulous amount of booty.
After the arrival of the galleon in the home port a huge sale was organized
to dispose of the cargo. But during this period a law-suit was filed in
the admiralty court to determine the right to the award of the booty. By
mutual consent the Advocate-Fiscal of Holland, the Company of the
eight ships and Admiral Heemskerck appeared as plaintiffs and requested
citation of all unknown persons claiming any interest in the cargo. At
the end of the required period of publication sentence was pronounced
on September 9, 1604, and "the carack, together with all the goods which
came out of it, were declared forfeited and confiscated."" As a result
of this lawsuit, according to Grotius, Holland, as the party really waging
the war, was entitled to the prize, but she waived her right in favor of
42. Id. at 11.
43. Ibid.
44. AiUEs or THE Aiu m-rY or AusTExwa, 9th September, 1604.
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the members of the States-General and the boards of admiralty.45 Grotius
was so enthusiastic about the booty that he described the prize as "the
finest and true fruit of the trade with the Indies. 40 In subordinating
the honest profits from legitimate commercial traffic to the greater gains
of privateering, Grotius was thus displaying an attitude of mind hardly
conducive to the unbiased consideration of the issues raised by the cap-
ture of the Catherina on which he was shortly to prepare a report. More
ethical by far in the same situation was the conduct of certain Mennonite
directors of the Company who sold their shares and retired, preferring
to disassociate themselves from an organization whose principal motive
was not commerce, but war.47
B. DE JURE PRAEDAE, OR THE LAW OF PEizE.-This, then, was the
situation which called forth the first literary efforts of Grotius in the
field of international law. The Portuguese naturally used the conduct
of those directors who withdrew from participation in the illegal profits
as a reason for seeking the aid of Spain, who now lined up with Portugal
for purposes of defense. All of these developments aroused great public
consternation, both locally and throughout Europe. Accordingly, the
directors of the Company felt the need of having their viewpoint pre-
sented in such a way as to show their compatriots, as well as all Europe,
that the East Indian Company had a right to act as they had acted in
the past and proposed to act in the future, and to expose the false pre-
tenses behind which their adversaries, the Portuguese and the Spaniards,
concealed their commercial rivalry.48
It was only natural that the Company should employ the same attorney
who had so ably represented it in its law-suit in the admiralty court
concerning the award of the prize. That he was closely connected with
the Company, and had direct access to their archives as well as its pre-
decessors can hardly be doubted.4" Having represented the Company
in the litigation originating out of its first important prize, at the urging
of the directors, he now set out to write a book which was not only
designed to constitute a second defense of their pecuniary interests, but
45. The first prize was followed by another in 1604. Fruin, op. cit. s upra note 41, at 31.
46. GRonus, DE JuRE PREDAX. 201.
47. Outstanding among the men of this character was Pieter Lijntgens, the head of a
great commercial house of Amsterdam, who planned to set up a new company for peace-
able trade. But the exclusive patent given to the United Company stood in the way. By
way of circumvention, it was decided to seek a patent from Henry IV of France, who
enthusiastically favored the scheme. But opposition of the original company, with which
the States-General sided, resulted in delay after delay, until the possibility was burled
with the murder of Henry IV. Fruin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 32-5.
48. Fruin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 35-6.
49. See Grotius' letter to his brother, Epist. App., No. 450, 507.
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also to-crush the bitter criticism which prevailed both at home and abroad.
The book which was called forth in this critical hour of world history
is now known as De Jure Praedae, or the Law of Prize. While only
twenty-one years of age, it is generally believed that Grotius was one
among but few lawyers of that day competent to handle the issues of
law raised by the Admiral of the East India Company when he seized
the Catherina-issues which involved an understanding of both the
laws of war and the laws of peace. By the time the book was completed,
however, having been written in the autumn of 1604, and the spring of
1605, the wave of criticism had substantially subsided, perhaps as a
result of the withdrawal of the Mennonites, which eliminated all internal
opposition on the part of the Company shareholders to the future capture
of prizes. Moreover, public opinion had swung to the side of the profit-
making enterprise, while at the same time underground gifts of part of
the booty to the French and English Crowns had won the Company
favorable consideration in those quarters. Under such circumstances,
the occasion which had suggested the effort originally, had been dissi-
pated, and accordingly the directors decided it was the wiser policy to
promote their trade and secure their rights of war, not by argumentation,
but by direct action. 0 Whatever the reason, the treatise, De Jure
Praedae, obviously prepared against a background of local and European
incidents and conditions as a piece of highly specialized pleading, in
which the objective was evident before the writing began and for which
the eager writer was undoubtedly generously compensated, was thus
abruptly doomed to partial obscurity for a period of two hundred and
sixty-five years.
What then were the scope and arguments advanced in De lure Prae-
dae? They were presented in three main divisions.
In the first, entitled Dogmatica de jure praedae, without reference
to the case of the Catherina, which was the direct occasion of the book,
Grotius deduced the right to wage war and take prizes as an incident
thereof, from the broad and systematic development of the principles
of natural law and the laws of nations.
The second division, under the title, Historica, describes the tyranny
of Alva, the Spaniard, which drove the Dutch to rebel against its prince
and to wage war against Spain and her allies. In addition, it pointed
out the mistreatment of the Dutch sailors at the hands of the Portuguese
in the East Indies and prior to the capture of the Catherina in 1603;
and it pointed out other forms of misconduct by the enemy, in the form
of slander, agitation of the natives, and finally open violence and murder.
SO. Fruin, op.-dt. supra note 41, at 37-40.
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In consequence, observes Grotius, the long-suffering and generous Dutch
were simply compelled as a matter of self-preservation to combat and
rob the enemy.
In the third division, beginning with Chapter XII, Mare Liberum,
the author sought to vindicate the conduct of the East India Company,
in acting as they did in taking prizes, seeking to bring this portion of the
argument within the purview of the Dogmatica of the first division. This
is merely another way of attempting to prove that the Portuguese pos-
sessed no exclusive right to trade with the East Indies, or to barter with
the natives thereof, hence they were unjustified in regarding the efforts
of the Dutch to trade in the Indies as hostile acts, punishable as such.
In the unprinted part of Chapter XII, Grotius goes one step further,
and justifies the conduct of the Dutch, according to the rights of war,
in fighting and robbing because the Portuguese sought to bar their trade. 1
In remaining chapters Grotius demonstrates that capturing prizes
under the circumstances was not only just, but in the interests of the
Republic, which profited, at the expense of the wealthy Portuguese.
While we can understand the non-publication of the Commentarihs
De Jure Praedae upon its completion in 1605, it is difficult to understand
why it was not published immediately after 1609. Fruin, the distinguished
Dutch historian suggests that one explanation is to be found in the very
inconsistency of publishing the whole work, after a part had appeared
separately, to ,wit, Mare Liberum of Chapter XII of the principal manu-
script. Moreover, observes the same commentator, that part of the
manuscript completing the third main division of the work, had lost its
currency, because the war, whose justice it had sought to prove, had
by that time been justified by the twelve-year armistice concluded in 1609.
This in no way invalidated the first and second parts, called the
Dogmatica and Historica, and doubtless Grotius looked forward to
their subsequent appearance on some more appropriate occasion, perhaps
in a slightly recast form. 2 For a while it seemed as if this occasion
was to present itself when the Board of the East India Company de-
liberated on September 16, 1610, on the question as to whether " 'they
ought not to have the trade with the East India described historically
by the advocate-fiscal Grotius or by some other learned person, to its
honour and reputation and to those of the country, to have it printed
when most convenient'."" Thus, for the second time, the relation of
Grotius to the Company as a special pleader appears in this resolution of
the Board and doubtless the conception of such a history was a product
51. Id. at 40-2.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Id. at 47. According to Fruin the resolution was never printed.
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of Grotius' own mind. This is indicated by the fact that when the re-
mainder of the Grotian papers were sold at the Hague in November,
1664, a collection of documents bearing on the Indian trade was found
in the same bundle with the Historica of the Commentarius, ready for
the pursuit of the project, which was never undertaken, becoming a victim
of the Company's procrastination. This was a tragic loss, as it leaves
only the Historica as a study of the Indian trade and travel2'
Intended to show the injustice of the Portuguese, and the innocence
of the Dutch, it follows that these two divisions of De lure Pracdae
constitute a detailed indictment of the Portuguese on one hand and a
stalwart defense of the Dutch East India Company on the other. The
lawyer of the company, like all counsel, emphasized those arguments
favorable to his client, and omitted any mention of those favorable
to his adversary. This aspect of special pleading will take on added im-
portance when we come to consider the relation of the first two divisions
of De Jure Praedae to the bulk of Grotius' work, De Jre Belli ac Pacis,
which did not appear until 1625, and was, as asserted by the author
himself, written upon a very high plane, with no reference to or relation-
ship with local or European incidentsl
Contrast the alleged long suffering of the Dutch at the hands of the
Portuguese, as described by Grotius, with the stories of the Dutch sailors,
which reveal contempt for the Indians and hatred for the Portuguese
and Spaniards. Under such circumstances, when passion ran high and
profits were at stake, patriotism and commercial interest were a unit,
and anything the enemy did was wrong. Now Grotius was bound to
have known this condition and hence "he cannot be acquitted of wilful
partiality in writing his narrative. As a rule he speaks the truth and
nothing but the truth, but not always the whole truth."511 Thus, for
example, Grotius states on page 262 of De Jure Pracdae that Heems-
kerck treated the crew of the Catherina well, and gave them liberty
without ransom, but he fails to mention that that was done according
to the capitulation terms, and on condition that the crew be returned
to Malucca, thus showing that the good faith is attributal to the Ad-
miral, and not to the generosity of the Dutch, as falsely represented by
Grotius. And worse than merely telling only part of the truth is the
characteristic of intentionally representing the enemy to be worse than
he was. Grotius was guilty of this when he ascribed the kidnapping and
execution of certain Dutch sailors as an example of violation of the
laws of war. Fruin points out that among his papers sold at the Hague
54. Ibid.
55. Id. at 48.
56. Id. at 49.
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was a document showing that these men had made a prior attack on
the Portuguese without a declaration of war, which amounted to an
act of piracy. 7 In concluding this phase of the matter Fruin aptly ob-
serves: "And now that we have once found in what manner DeGroot
uses his documents, we shall h~nceforth be on our guard against allow-
ing his representation of matters to testify against the enemy without
further confirmation." 8
C. MARE LIBERUM, OR THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.-Doubtless this
outcome of his effort was a severe disappointment to Grotius, for he
dropped his study in the field of public law for a time. But in Decem-
ber, 1607, he was appointed Advocate-Fiscal of the Court of Holland
and Zealand, which again directed his attention to constitutional law.
In the same year peace negotiations with Spain began again, but although
Spain was willing to recognize the independence of the States, a dead-
lock developed because Spain insisted upon prohibiting and the States
upon maintaining trade with the East Indies. It began to appear that
the States, greatly desiring peace, would surrender to the demands of
the Spaniards. The East India Company, apprehensive of such a re-
sult, caused the publication of a series of pamphlets vindicating their title
and emphasizing the importance of the trade, which development doubt-
less served to remind Grotius of the completely finished but unpublished
manuscript, available but not called for, and his mind must have re-
peatedly adverted to that part of the work which exposed the claims of
the Portuguese to exclusive trade on grounds of natural right and under
the laws of nations. It is not surprising then to find that under these
circumstances, he reviewed the treatise, and determined to publish sepa-
rately Chapter XII, dealing with the freedom of the seas. 9
D. The Battle of the Books.-Published therefore in the midst of the
negotiations between Holland and Spain in 1608, with the avowed pur-
pose of making the Spaniards more reasonable and the Dutchmen
firmer, it seems extremely doubtful whether Mare Liberum appeared
in time to accomplish that objective.6° Nor did it when first published
attract great attention. According to Fruin, who made a most extended
57. Id. at 50.
58. Ibid.
59. Id. at 41-2.
60. "Chronology, methinks, refutes his (Grotius') assertion; for the publication cannot
have taken place before the first days of March (on the 18th of February he sent Heinsius
the preface and the appendices) and as early as the 18th of March Jeannin reported to
the States on the progress of the negotiations, from which it appeared that everything,
also the difference about the trade with the Indies, had been arranged during the Armis-
tice. How, then, can De Groot's argument have influenced the course of affairs?" Frun,
op. cit. supra note 41, at 42.
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and significant study of the problem, the English and French ambassa-
dors stationed at the Hague at that time, made no mention of the book
in their dispatches to their respective governments. And the event
appears even to have gone without notice in the Dutch publications of
the day. Perhaps this may be attributed to the fact that it appeared
anonymously, immediately after an armistice between Holland and Spain
had been signed on April 9, 1609, which was to last for a period of
twelve years. Moreover, there was nothing in the book that was start-
lingly new or calculated to center the attention of the world upon its
implications. In refuting the claim of the Portuguese, it merely adopted
the views earlier expressed by the distinguished Spanish theologians,
Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617),
and the celebrated lawyer and jurisconsult, Fernandos Vdzquez (1509-
1566). Moreover, the gospel of the freedom of the seas which he ad-
vanced in favor of the right of the Dutch to trade in the East Indies,
as opposed to the Portuguese, who claimed dominion over the seas in
question, was the same as that presented four years earlier by the
English East India Company in a petition to King James, who at the
time was negotiating peace with Spain, in which the right of the English
to trade with the Indies was vindicated on exactly the same grounds as
those now relied upon by the author of the anonymous Mare Liberrne.
Originally published in Latin by Elzevier, of Leiden,G' it was not even
translated into the native tongue of the author, although his identity
was an open secret.62 But this condition was not to prevail for long. For
only a few weeks after the appearance of the publication the King of
England issued an edict in which all fishing on the coasts and in the
seas of Great Britain, Ireland and other surrounding islands, was pro-
hibited, except under a license from his Majesty or the commissioners
appointed by him. While the issue thus raised was not that of the
freedom of the seas, nor the right of navigation, which Grotius had
treated, but the narrower question as to the right of fishery in a special
part of the sea, it followed that the Grotian doctrine, as laid down in
Mare Liberum, if pressed to a dryly logical extreme, would make wholly
untenable such a minor claim to the exclusive possession of the sea even
though for fishing purposes only.0 From that moment on, in the eyes
of English authors, and in the eyes of the world at large, Mare Liberunm
61. The books printed by Elzevier have become highly prized among dicriminating
book collectors as fine examples of early printing.
62. See Introductory Note by James Brown Scott, in GroTus, Tim Fnzmeoz- or Tm
S.As (1916). Translated with a Revision of the Latin Text of 1663 by Ralph Van Deman
Magoffin.
63. Fruin, op. dt. supra note 41, at 44.
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began to assume larger significance, and soon we find successive, but rela-
tively ineffective, efforts to silence Grotius. The first effort came in
1612, when William Welwood published his Abridgment of all the Sea
Laws, in which he maintained the English view of the issue 4 in a rather
unscientific manner. Grotius prepared a reply to Welwood's first at-
tack, 5 which for some reason was not then published, being discovered
in 1864, at the same time as the commentary De Jure Praedae, and pub-
lished in 1872.06 Far more significant was the defense of the English
position in Mare Clausum prepared by the distinguished lawyer, scholar
and publicist, John Selden in 1617 or 1618, and offered to King James,
only to have its publication delayed until 1635, at which time it finally
saw the public light by direct order of King Charles I, to whom it was
dedicated. 7 This battle of the books, viewed from the standpoint of
the acceptance of the respective positions advocated by the two an-
tagonists, resulted in a victory for the Dutch gladiator."
After Selden had prepared his book entitled Mare Clausum in 1617-
18, and its publication had been delayed, Grotius, between 1622 and
1625 and while in Paris, completed his famous book, De Jure Belli ac
Pacis, or the Law of War and Peace, upon which his claim to fame as
the father of international law is premised. As the story goes, in Novem-
ber, 1622, he began collecting the necessary materials and formulating
the plan of the work. Six months later, or in April, 1623, he began sys-
tematic work on the project, making haste slowly. Thirteen months
later, or in June, 1624, it was substantially completed, except for the
64. Introductory Note by James Brown Scott in GRonIUs, op. cit. supra note 62, at
viii, n. 1.
65. Title XXVII, pp. 61-72, dealt with the community and property of the seas. Wel-
wood also published a second work two years later in Latin, entitled De Domido Inns-
busque a Dominiurn praecipue spectantibus Assertia ac Methodica.
66. This reply was entitled, Defensio Capitis Quinti Marls Liberi Oppugnati a Gulielmo
Welwodo Juris Civiis Projessore, Capite XXVII ejus Libri Sciptli Anglica Sermone cil
Titulum Fecit Compendium Legum Maritimarum. This manuscript is now available In
the Leiden University.
67. The dedication read: "There are among foreign writers, who rashly attribute your
Majesty's more southern and eastern sea to their princes. Nor are there a few, who
following chiefly some of the ancient Caesarian lawyers, endeavor to affirm, or beyond
reason too easily admit, that all seas are common to the universality of mankind." Gao-
rrus, op. cit. supra note 62, at ix.
68. "If it cannot be said that Grotius wears his learning 'lightly like a flower,' the
treatise of Selden is, in comparison, over-freighted with it; the Mare Liberum is still
an open book, the Mare Clausum is indeed a closed one, and as flotsam or jetsam on
troubled waters, Chapter XII of the Law of Prize rides the waves, whereas its rival,
heavy and water-logged, has gone under." Ibid.
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drafting of a final copy. 9 In the execution of this work, Grotius delib-
erately refrained from all references to the events of this period, and
from any adverse criticism of the deeds of nations or their rulers, of
which he was fully conversant, either as a student of jurisprudence,
philosophy and theology, or as a witness at first hand. In paragraph 58
of the Prolegomena of De lure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius, in referring to
this very matter, declared:
"The reader will do me injustice, if he judges me to have written with a regard to
any controversies of our own time; either such as already exist, or such as can be
foreseen as likely to arise. I profess, in all sincerity, that, as mathematicians con-
sider their figures as abstracted from body, so did I, in treating of Rights, abstract
my mind from every particular fact." 70
Thus, it must be observed, that Grotius purported to be developing
the eternal and immutable principles which were to govern the conduct
of mankind in peace and war in the age in which he lived and in the
ages to come; he was operating on a plane completely above this mun-
dane world; he was extracting the eternal verities of the law from
nature itself, completely separated from what are today known as the
realistic facts of life.
If, in making this profession for posterity, Grotius was intellectually
honest and sincere, then he is entitled to have his contribution to inter-
national law measured on that plane; but if this profession, needlessly
made, turns out to be false and the product of insincerity, then it may
cast some doubt, although not necessarily so, upon the total validity or in-
tegrity of the views he expressed in Mare Libemam as well as those de-
veloped in De lure Belli ac Pacis.
In reality then, was Grotius searching for the eternal principles
-which were to regulate international relations, or may his failure to
deal with or make any reference to past or present questions of law
having a direct bearing on his topic, be explained on some other grounds?
The answer to the first question must be in the negative, for two reasons.
In the first place, he was living in Paris at the time, under the direct
protection of the French King, having been exiled from his native
land. 1 As a consequence, and as a sheer matter of self-preservation, he
had to steer clear of matters which concerned the interests of France
or its King. In the second place, having ostensibly set himself the task
of writing for posterity, and not for his contemporaries, it became
necessary to launch his enterprise on the plane of the eternal verities,
69. Fruin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 55.
70. See GRonrus, DE JuRE BUMn AC PAcs .-xix (1853). Accompanied by an Abridged
Translation by William Whelwell, with the Notes of the Author, Barbeyrac, and others.
71. Fruin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 55.
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and to appear to ignore the relation of, the principles presented to the
events of the day at home or abroad. By pursuing such a policy, by
remaining silent as to his opinion concerning current affairs, "which
is far removed, indeed from true impartiality, from judging without
respect of parties,"72 was Grotius able to increase the value and prestige
of his work. Fruin feels that he may have realized his objective "in the
eyes of his contemporaries,'"" who may have been pleased because no
one was condemned or criticized. He had remained aloof and above the
factions of the day in the field of abstract principles, as the King above
the warring groups under his rule. If the King does wrong, not he, but
his ministers are responsible. So, likewise, with Grotius. The validity
and scope of his arguments might remain unquestioned, yet their effect
as applied to the particular events of the day might be successfully chal-
lenged. As to whether the conceptions of law which Grotius thus pur-
ported to develop in such a rarified state, can be eternally and absolutely
true, aside from the background of actual conditions against which they
were drawn up, is doubtful. Their chief significance lies in their im-
portance to the age in which they were written; to all other ages their
significance is mostly historical, as evidence of what the law then may
have been and not as evidence of what the law may be today.
If this be true, in order to measure the value of the work, we need to
discover how far the author and his message reflected the spirit of his
times. And about this crucial matter Grotius has been strangely silent,
being content to observe in letters to his friends that his sole inspiration
was to reduce the lust for warfare which seemed to prevail among princes
and nations-a declaration which is too general to satisfy one seeking
the truth. We desire to know why Grotius sought "to place his doctrine
outside his time, to insure eternal authority to it; we wish to consider it
as the fruit of his time, in order to fairly determine its relative value." 4
E. The Relationship Between De Jure Praedae (1603-1604) and De
Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625).-Was the latter work, upon which the auth-
or's chief claim to fame rests, written on the high plane as professed in
the Prolegomena, entirely disassociated from the events in Holland and
the world at large, or was it, like practically all other great works, re-
flective of the age in which it was produced?
The answer to these two questions is to be discovered in a comparison
of the conceptions of international law as developed in the earlier and
later work. According to Fruin, the Dogmatica de jure praedae, the
most significant portion of the earlier work, was identical with the first
72. Id. at 6.
73. Ibid.
74. Id. at 7.
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half of De Jure Belli ac Pacis,75 which the author had, by his protesta-
tions, led us to believe was the sole product of his efforts between April,
1623 and November, 1624, or only a period of thirteen months, when,
as a matter of fact, it was the joint product of the effort which Grotius
originally expended in the original draft of De Jure Praedae, as counsel
for the East India Company in 1603-1604, plus his subsequent effort in
making such revision of the original as would be natural at the hands
of the same author of more mature years, and rendered more conservative
by the exigencies of exile and the hope for permission to return home.
The truth seems to be, that from the moment of the publication of Mare
Liberum, making the publication of the entire work impossible, Grotius
had entertained the prospect of revising the Dogmatica, the principal
portion of the original work, and hence lapsed into a twenty-year period
of silence. During this period he read widely and during his stay in prison
in Holland prior to his escape to France, he read hts Belli and Advoca-
tiones Hispanicae, both written by Albericus Gentilis, from whom many
authorities assert, he borrowed much. And then, shortly after he reached
Paris he began work on Jus belli ac pacis, a title taken directly from
Cicero.76 In the work now begun Grotius undoubtedly had before him
his earlier manuscript, De Jure Praedae, adopting the greater portion of
it in slightly modified form. This required no preliminary study, but
merely a slight recasting to remove any reference which might have re-
vealed its original background. Only the latter part of the work under
the title, Jus Pats, was originally composed, and this explains why such
a short time was required in completing the first draft, and why the work,
as a whole, lacks unity,77 and in quality fails completely to measure up
to the standards set in the earlier effort. Fruin ascribes this failure to
the fact that in the earlier work Grotius limited himself to a single task
of proving that the East India Company had a right to take booty from
the Portuguese in the East Indies, whereas, in the latter work, he was
seeking to develop an entirely new science of international law, the out-
75. Id. at 54.
76. ORA-nO PRO Bo BO cap. 6.
77. Fruin, in referring to the point observes: "In my opinion the work does not form
a well composed and complete whole. I must grant Rufendorf (Specimen controv. cap.
IV, § 1) to be right when he says that the author has not discussed everything that his
subject comprises and on the other hand is treated of details of the law of war which
had better been omitted in a work of such a general nature. This is especially evident
when we compare it with the composition De Jure Praedae. We then discover that the
law of war is the real nucleus of the whole work and that what was added to it-nearly
all the second book--destroys the original connection without substituting another firm
union. Fruin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 56.
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lines of which were not too clearly drawn even in his own mind.18 In
other words, if the war in the Indies was treated as a private war of the
Company, or as merely a portion of the war carried on by the Republic
against King Phillip and his subjects, in which the role of the Company
was merely that of subject, the proof would have to be different. If the
former were the situation, then Grotius had the task of proving that a
private individual could wage war and take prizes and that the Company
could do likewise under the circumstances, whereas, if the latter were the
case, then the right of the Republic to wage war against the Portuguese
would have to be established, and also, that in so doing it could make use
of the Company, turning over to it such booty as it might capture. But
before these issues could be determined the whole law of war had to be
considered; whether the objection that no Christian war could be waged
and prizes captured, could be satisfactorily surmounted; whether war
was lawful, and if so, for what reasons, and in what manner, and for
what purposes could it be waged? Moreover, the rights and obligations
of the subjects of the contending powers had to be clarified and fixed,
and in this particular case with reference to the right of taking prizes.
In thus covering the whole gamut of war and peace, and organizing the
materials into a unified system, Grotius observed the rules of artistic
form, marshalled his arguments in such a way as to demonstrate the
points which he desired to make, discussed and reported, at least to his
own satisfaction, those objections of others which obstructed the course
of his argument, at the very point necessary to give additional emphasis
to the thesis sought to be demonstrated. In short, the arguments were
marshalled and presented in the systematic form of a brief or a piece of
special pleading, which in truth it was. Aiming at the proof of the right
of war, he cast his ideas so as to achieve that objective, and this explains
why, when he came to the task twenty years later of transforming his
pleadings into a text book on the law of war and peace, it required no
long period of preparation. Except for a less absolute tone, Jus Praedae
and Jus Belli are substantially identical, a difference easily attributable
to the fact that when he wrote the earlier work he was a youthful citizen
of a "state which had just asserted its independence by rebellion, whereas
when he made the revision, he was a regent in exile in Paris as a result
of a rebellion against the established Dutch government growing out of
religious discord. This probably explains one of the few variances be-
tween the earlier and later work, to wit, as to the right of subjects to
rebel against their prince.79
It is interesting to know that Grotius did not regard his Mare Liberum,
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 57-9.
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or the remainder of the work, De Jure Praedac, of which it was a part,
of great weight. Most assuredly, he regarded his De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
and not the earlier work, which remained unknown to the world for two
hundred and sixty-five years, as ranking far above the original contri-
bution. This was natural, as being an afflicted man in exile from his
native land, sobered by the ingratitude of his own people, he undoubtedly
rejoiced at the prospect that posterity was not to judge his work on the
earlier product, De Jure Praedae, written while he was an inexperienced
youth, filled with high ideals, and out of a desire to vindicate the conduct
of his countrymen, but rather was to base its judgment on De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, the latter effort which, so far as the world was to know for
two hundred and sixty-five years, was the product of a mind tempered
by bitter experience, and filled with the wisdom which comes only from
long years of keen observation and sober reflectionS0
Thus as a condition precedent to a reappraisal of the total validity of
Grotius' work on the freedom of the seas, we have been compelled to
survey somewhat in detail his various contributions in the field of inter-
national law, in order to acquire a picture of the background against
which he worked, and by which the value of his contribution on the free-
dom of the seas, as well as to the law of nations, must be measured.
IV. As THus FORMULATED AND PROMULGATED WHAT WATAS THE OB-
JECTIVE AND THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE GROTiAN D0cnmNE?
The primary objective of Grotius in publishing Mare Libierum in 1609,
was to prevent Holland, then engaged in negotiating a twelve-year armis-
tice with Spain and Portugal, from acceding to the claim of their ad-
versaries to the exclusive control of the Indian Ocean and of that washing
the West Coast of Africa. As Holland was in no condition to sustain its
position by war, Grotius set out to do so by formulating and promulgating
a new theory of the freedom of the seas, under which Holland would
be legally justified in carrying on trade with the East Indies.
A. THE THEORY OF THE GROTI N CONCEPT.-With this objective clear-
ly in mind, we may now turn to the theory invoked by Grotius to bring
about its realization. The doctrine advanced was that by the law of
nations navigation was free to all persons, which he purported to derive
from the law of nature. The theory ran somewhat as follows: As the
law of nature arises out of Divine Providence, it remains immutable.
Under this theory of natural law, from which Grotius derives the law
of nations, originally both sea and land were the common property of
80. Id. at 70.
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mankind, and therefore every one was free to navigate the seas. The
theory was supported by two arguments, one, that because of the fluid
character of the sea it was incapable of occupation or enclosure, the
other, that its products could not be exhausted by general or promiscuous
use, either by navigation or fishing, hence the sea was necessarily free.
Mindful of the fact that with reference to land there was a partial aban-
donment of the natural law by which it was at first held in common, only
subsequently to be distinguished and divided, and finally separated from
the primitive community of use, Grotius declared that the secondary
law of nations operated-upon land differently than upon the sea, because
of expediency and necessity., In short, said Grotius, if the rule of
immutability were applied to land, or to a river, their products would
soon be exhausted. Under the subjects of navigation, ownership of the
sea, and the right to trade, Grotius examines the various titles under
which Portugal claimed its empire of the Indian seas, and marshalls
his arguments in favor of his avowed thesis. Under each heading, he
denies the right to title by discovery, by occupation, by papal gift or
by war, and concludes that the Portuguese were completely unjustified
in their claims, and that therefore the Dutch had, as against the Portu-
guese, the right to trade freely with the Indies, and, if necessary, in order
to do so, wage war, which could be justified as legitimate under the prin-
ciples of the law of nations.8 2
The doctrine thus announced was in direct opposition to that held by
the ancient and modern states, as well as to the pretensions of the British
Government to the exclusive sovereignty over the waters surrounding
the coasts of Great Britain. Selden, as we have seen, undertook to re-
fute the thesis of Grotius in his Mare Clausum, written in 1617-1618,
but not published until 1635. He sought to point out that in accordance
with the natural law as well as the law of nations, the sea, like the land,
could be occupied, pointing out that the right which foreign vessels had
to travel waters belonging to other nations was analogous to similar privi-
leges sometimes imposed upon landed proprietors.88 To the objection
advanced by Grotius that it was impossible to establish limits or fran-
chises in the seas, Selden maintained with the better reason that parallels
and meridians could serve as frontiers as well as walls, rivers or
trenches.8 4 But while Selden supported the right of appropriations in
81. GRoTius, THE FREEDO oF TmE SEAs 47-61 (1916). Translated with a Revision of
the Latin Text of 1633, by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin. The whole argument Is taken
word for word from Vfizquez. 1 ScoTr, LAW, Tim STATE, ANv TE INTERNATioNAL CoM-
mcuN=r 539 (1939).
82. GROTIUS, op. cit. supra note 81 at 47-61.
83. SELDEN, MARE CrLAustum 123-4 (1663).
84. 1 CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THEoRiQUE ET PRAT QUE § 351 (5th ed. 1896).
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theory, he took the position that for a state to forbid navigation of its
seas by other peoples would be recreant to the duties owed to humanity.
Although Selden's arguments were logically superior to those of Grotius,
and displayed vast erudition, and a broad understanding of history, geog-
raphy, nautical science and law, his efforts were powerless to stem the
tide in favor of the Grotian doctrine, for reasons which will shortly
appear. As we shall see, it was not the force of argument or logic which
carried the day for Grotius, since subsequent exponents of the positivist
doctrine of international law, rightly or wrongly completely repudiate
the concept that international law can be the product of natural law,s5
although they favored the concept of free seas. As usual in such cases
the truth probably lies somewhere in between the extremes of the two
theories. Thus, some rules of international law may have a foundation
in natural la7, whereas others may rest on agreement between the states
making up the international community.80
In the final analysis, it may well be doubted whether the theories,
advanced by the various writers, that the sea was or was not free because
susceptible or insusceptible of occupation, had any great bearing upon
the determination of the issue. Perhaps the restrictive movement against
dominion of the sea was accelerated by the theories advanced in the
books, but these theories, as such, never achieved general acceptance
"outside the realm of books." 8 7
V. TnE GRO TAN DOCTRINE AS APPLIED IN THE Two HUNDRED YEAR
PERIOD FOLLOWING ITS ANNOUNCEMENT
What, then, was the effect of the Grotian doctrine of the freedom of
the seas? It is submitted that Mare Liberun was neither immediately
nor subsequently of any direct practical effect; its indirect impact may
have been decisive. As we have pointed out there is grave doubt as to
whether it appeared early enough to affect the 1609 armistice nego-
tiations. Although the work of Grotius, measured by knowledge and
85. See the view of Anzilotti's theory as applied to this topic set out in Sr.EN, Tim
ITALLAN CoNcEmpoN or INT.NATIO.wAL LAW 217-20 (1943).
86. "The [positivist] doctrine intended to proceed to a strictly legal analyis of inter-
national law as a reaction to natural law and political and moral infiltrations. Its point
of departure was that all international law is voluntary, but this principle was gradually
abandoned. Some rules of international law may have a foundation other than the ill
of the states. The problem is to ascertain which these rules really are and to reject from
the field of positive law the principles and rules not based on the will of the states whose
exdstence had been arbitrarily affirmed by the doctrine of natural law." SzEn.r, op. cit.
supra note 85, at 250.
87. HAIL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (8th ed. 1917).
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method was perhaps inferior to that of Selden, "it had the incontestable
merit of having proclaimed the freedom of the seas and of having entered
directly into the spirit of modern civilization.18 8 In other words, it was
the timeliness of the message rather than the message itself which gave
it what currency it enjoyed. By contrast, Selden, the better logician,
who was less empirical, yet more profound than his adversary, achieved
a result directly contrary to what he had in mind in his Mare Clausum.
Although he declared it would be unwise for a nation exercising dominion
over the sea to deny the right of innocent passage to another friendly
power, by the very nature, extent and force of his arguments, he con-
firmed the British Crown in its announced policy of exercising dominion
over the British seas. In the execution of this policy, the British required
foreigners desiring to fish in their seas to obtain a license, and when
the Dutch, in 1636, sought to fish without a license, they Njere attacked
and compelled to pay £30,000 for permission to carry on.80 Ships enter-
ing upon British seas were required to accord honors of the flag as a
symbol of British maritime sovereignty. In short, the conduct of the
British was so brutal and outrageous, so exclusive and dominating, over
the succeeding years, as to provoke a strong reaction in favor of the
Grotian concept, with the result that the weaker maritime powers, almost
as a matter of self-preservation, abandoned the banner set up by Selden. 0
Thus, indirectly the mere existence of the Grotian theory may have
exerted a negative influence in determining the issue. But in truth the
battle for control of the seas had been transferred from the books, where
the doctrine was alternately supported and attacked upon both natural-
istic and positivist theories of the law,"' to the ocean highways of the
world, where, during the Seventeenth Century, despite the vigor with
which England persevered in her ruthless policy of exclusiveness and
dominion, the tide gradually began to drift in the other direction.
Thus, during the period of the Renaissance, when international law
was in process of creation, the common European theory with respect
to the sea was grounded on the idea that it was possible to acquire prop-
erty in it, and in practice most seas were regarded as in fact appropri-
ated. 2 But in the Sixteenth Century, the exorbitant claims of Portugal
and Spain had caused a reaction, which in the field of argument produced
Mare Liberum, while a more practical response developed in the preda-
tory voyages of Cavendish and Drake, and in the trade which the Dutch
88. C~Avo, op. cit. supra note 84, at 476.
89. HALL, op. cit. supra note 87, at 183.
90. CALvo, op. cit. supra note 84, § 350.
91. See SEais, op. cit. supra note 85, c. XII.
92. HALL, op. cit. supra note 87, at 180.
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carried on in the East Indies. When Queen Elizabeth was faced by
complaint that English ships were intruding in the waters of the East
Indies, she rejected such complaints, refusing to acknowledge that Spain
could bar her subjects from "freely navigating that vast ocean, as the use
of the sea and air is common to all; neither can a title to the ocean be-
long to any people or private persons, for as much as neither native nor
public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof."0 3 Consistency,
it will be observed, was no virtue of Elizabeth, for the principle asserted,
if correct, was equally applicable to the British as well as the Indian
seas, and it was substantially the same as that which formed the basis
of the Grotian attack upon the Portuguese in his Mare Liberum. Perhaps
the Dutch doctrine as advanced by Grotius went further than necessary
to destroy the Portuguese and Spanish pretensions, because Holland,
herself, was in effect a prisoner within the British seas. Although the
world was anxious to secure the right of navigation, it probably was not
desirous of depriving states of minor rights of property and the general
rights of sovereignty incidental to national ownership. Thus, Selden,
who maintained the right of appropriation on principle and as a custom-
ary fact, was favorable to free navigation on grounds of humanity. In
practice, the extent of dominion exercised by various nations was de-
termined by the fact of effective possession or by treaties. Except for
the fact that the seas became safer, this was the situation during the
earlier part of the Seventeenth Century. By the end of the century, al-
though in theory England upheld her title to the British seas, there was
a wide difference between the theory and the practice, under which
proprietary rights over the open sea were everywhere dwindling almost
to the vanishing point. Thus, in the negotiations with the United States
concerning the issue as to the right of Great Britain to search American
vessels in 1803, no progress was made because the English Crown could
not bring itself to concede freedom from search in the British seas.o'
The acquisition of Alaska led the United States to claim a separation
of the Behring Sea from the Pacific Ocean, and along the coast of Alaska
a space 1,500 miles long and 60 miles wide. England took exception to
this claim and the ensuing controversy was settled by arbitration, under
which the proprietary claim of the United States was dropped in favor
of a claim to jurisdictional rights of control," the basis of which is en-
tirely different from claim of dominion."' Turning to the history of
93. CAMDEN, HsToRy Or ELIZABET (1850).
94. MR. K G TO MR. MA IsoN, BRrrIS AN.qD FOREIGN STATE PAPEM, 1812-1814, 1404.
95. HIL, op. cit. supra note 87, at 187.
96. On the distinction between dominion and jurisdiction, see SEnnu, op. cit. supra
note 85, at 69.
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treaties during the Eighteenth Century, we find that the tendency was
to restrict the scope of maritime occupation, accompanied by an admission
that the open sea could not be possessed, being indivisible, inexhaustible
and productive. Ignoring the fact that under this theory all parts of the
sea would be free it would appear that the right of maritime occupation
should have been completely denied. But this is not what happened.
Enclosed seas, straits and littoral seas were held susceptible of occu-
pation. In other words, England, as well as other nations, found it
physically impossible to appropriate all the seas. Although in theory
they might claim domain, there was in fact a wide difference between
the theory and the degree to which proprietary rights over the sea could
be maintained. It was less expensive and more efficient to have each
nation protect and safeguard those seas nearest its shores in order that
commercial traffic could safely flow to and fro. In short, while Grotius
and his antagonists were carrying on the battle of the books, where
freedom of the seas existed at least in theory, the real doctrine of free-
dom of navigation was being hammered out as a rule of convenience
on the anvil of commercial, naval and political rivalry. Under this rule,
the true key to the development of the law was to be sought in the prin-
ciple that maritime occupation must be effective in order to be valid.
When considered in the light of the fact that the proprietor of territorial
waters may not lawfully deny innocent passage to foreign ships, it recon-
ciles the interest of a particular state with those of the international
community of states at large. Thus, the principle of the freedom of the
seas, as taught in the universities by Bartolus and Baldus, as debated
and clarified within the theological cloisters by Victoria, Suarez, and
Azquez, and as modified by the juristic learning and philosophy of
Gentili and his successors, has gradually emerged from the field of theo-
retic discussion, as carried on in the books, to enter triumphantly upon
the modern scene as the accepted doctrine of all nations-a product,
not a theory, but of the accumulated practical experience of seafaring
men.
Under this doctrine, the public external law of both Europe and
America recognizes that no nation may exercise exclusive dominion
over the high seas, that the flags of all nations which observe the rules
of international law may enjoy the same rights and liberties, that su-
perior naval power does not give one state pre-eminence over another,
that the violation of the rules concerning the freedom of the seas by
any nation is subject to condemnation; and that unusual police measures
by way of supervision, the product of treaties relative to the ships of
one or more nations, are the creation of the contracting parties.
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VI. LIMITATIONS UPON TH:E DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
In order to measure the limitation upon the principle of free seas, as
promulgated by Grotius, it now becomes necessary to consider the true
origin of the concept, the distinction between dominion and jurisdiction
and the derivation of the conception of the territorial sea.
A. THE TRUE FACTS CONCERNING THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS CONCEPT. -According to Sereni, the conception of
freedom of the seas is directly traceable to the Roman doctrine of the res
extra commercium, or things beyond commerce. But the Romans did not
recognize this principle in practice, as they considered the entire sea sub-
ject to their dominion, which could be acquired either by investiture by
the emperor, which was of feudal origin, or by acquisitive prescription,
which was of Roman origin.97 Thus, for example, Rome claimed complete
dominion over the Mediterranean, referring to it as mare nostrum, and ex-
erted such control as was necessary to repress piratical activities and to
exclude competitors, such as the Carthaginians and later such peoples as
were not federated with the empire. Although the Roman legal authorities,
such as Marciaius, Paulus and Ulpian taught that the sea was a res extra
co-mmerciumn, they did not intend to imply that it could not be held in
dominion by a sovereign government, but were merely affirming that it
could not be the subject of private property 8 In Roman law, therefore,
a distinction was made between res extra commercium and res in com-
mercio, the latter susceptible of private appropriation. And this dis-
tinction, a product of Roman private international law, was transposed
by the Italian jurisconsults of the Renaissance to the sphere of inter-
national relations, for the purpose of and as a foundation for asserting
that there were parts of the earth's surface which could not be subjected
to exclusive dominion by any state, to wit, the high seas." By asserting
such a principle, these jurists were not saying that the high seas were
not subject to the empire of any law, but were merely saying that no
state could lawfully bar other states from making free use of the high
seas for navigation or fishing. If this were not true, no country could
have punished piracy and other crimes on the high seas, which failure
would have destroyed all security of navigation. What they really meant
was that in practice, sovereignty over the high seas was beyond the reach
of and could not be acquired or maintained by any state, whereas juris-
97. See SEamx, op. cit. supra note 85, at 68, 71.
98. 3 Gn m, LE DRoT InEENATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA =R 35.
99. 'We have here a typical example of the procedure frequently followed by the
Italian jurists of the Renaissance, consisting of the creation of entirely new principles by
means of an arbitrary interpretation of Roman texts." S=o4, op. dt. supra note 85, at 68.
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diction to punish wrongs and to repress piracy, was acquirable, if not
indeed, an incidental or inherent power of every state.
B. DOMINION AND JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED.-Thus, the principle
of free seas and the distinction between dominion and jurisdiction, were
both products of the early Renaissance period. As such they were bound
to undergo a revolutionary process paralleling the change in Europe's
political status. This was particularly true as to jurisdiction. In the
imperial period, according to the glossators, it meant that jurisdiction
over the high seas belonged only to the emperor, 100 but this conception
gradually changed with the decline of the empire and the rise of the
great independent maritime powers. This transformation is evidenced
in the works of Alberico Gentili, who lived and taught in England while
the spirit of nationalism was producing independent states. Under his
influence the law governing the high seas ceased to be the law of the
empire, and became international law. In reaching this result Gentili
followed the precepts of natural law, in accordance with which the rules
of jus gentium were to guarantee the freedom of the high seas, which
were not susceptible of dominion, but which were susceptible of having
jurisdiction exerted over them by every sovereign state for purposes of
punishing crime and suppressing piracy. Such jurisdiction, according
to Gentili, was not to be permitted to "degenerate into abuse," by one
nation denying the use of the sea to another, which action could justifi-
ably be regarded as sufficient cause for lawfully waging war.1°1 But
the distinction between dominion and jurisdiction has survived, under
which it is now well established that the principle of free seas does not
exclude the right of every state from exercising a large measure of
jurisdiction over them, as for example, in suppressing piracy.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA CONCEPT.-Unlike the
free sea doctrine, the conception of a territorial sea was not a product
of Roman law. This was natural as the Romans held that the sea was
subject to their dominion, hence they had no occasion for distinguishing
between the high seas and the seas adjacent to their coasts. 10 2 But after
the fall of the empire, and during the early days of the Renaissance,
when the Italian maritime cities advanced claims upon the neighboring
waters, the conception of territorial waters began to emerge in the
100. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 19 (1598).
101. Id. c. 19.
102. This concept of territorial waters, which, as we shall see, was developed by Italian
jurists in the Mediterranean area, out of feudal principles of law, had a separate and
independent development among the countries bordering on the North Sea, the territorial
waters being there regarded as a part of their respective territories as early as the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Centuries. FEDOZZI, TRATTATO DR DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALI, INTRODUZIONE E
PARTE GENERALE 381 (2d ed. 1933).
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Mediterranean and its development was a product of the "ingenuity of
Italian juris consults."" 3 This new doctrine was first expounded by
the canon and not the civilian lawyers, because of the impossibility of
relating it to the principles of Roman law.'" As Roman law acknowleged
the freedom of the seas, it became necessary to appeal to feudal prin-
ciples of law in developing the doctrine of territorial waters. Reference
to the concept was made in the Sixth Book of the Decretals of Boniface
VIII."°5 But for the development of a complete legal theory of territorial
waters, resort must be had to certain passages in the works of the glos-
sators,'0° who were thus instrumental in defining and placing the first
limitation upon the principle of the freedom of the seas. With Bartolus
(1314-1357), the concept assumed more definite form. It was not that
he considered the adjacent waters a part of the territory and hence
within the dominion of the coastal sovereign, but rather that they were
capable of becoming the subject of jurisdiction exerted by such author-
ity. ' While the concept of territorial waters visualized in the mind of
Bartolus was not in accord with the modern view, it is now clear that
he contributed mightily in the creation of the modern concept in two
respects: first, by recognizing the existence in point of fact and practice
of certain maritime zones over which the coastal sovereign could exercise
exclusive dominion; and second, by placing a limit upon such zones.
According to Baldus (1327-1406), who reaffirmed the territorial waters
concept as developed by Bartolus, the coastal sovereign did not possess
an absolute dominion over the adjacent waters, but was vested only
with the rights of jurisdiction, ownership, and use, coupled with an
obligation to protect ships sailing in these territorial waters against pi-
rates. As opposed to Bartolus, who placed a limit of the distance which
a ship could sail in two days, upon the exercise of control in territorial
waters, Baldus limited the control to sixty miles, or the distance which
a ship could cover in one day; while Van Bynkershock held that the
control of the land over the sea extended as far as a cannon would carry.
103. SEazN-i, op. cit. supra note 85, at 70.
104. See CAnSACCM, L'occupAzIoa nE D arux cosrrm, 75-78 (1936) for a dkcussion
of the difficulties encountered by those seeking to reconcile the freedom of the seas doctrine,
as recognized by Roman jurists, with the principle of sovereign control by the coastal
state over the territorial waters adjacent thereto.
105. By Domenico di San Gimignano, the distinguished Tuscan canonist of the Four-
teenth Century. See also Fenn, Origins of the Theory of Teritorial Waters, 20 Am J.
INTL L. 465 (1926).
106. SEa zi, op. cit. supra note 85, at 71.
107. This concept was utilized by Bartolus in determining sovereignty over islands.
Those in the adjacent sea were said to belong to the coastal sovereign. Control over the
adjacent sea was fixed at one hundred Italian miles.
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However this may be, Baldus' merit lies in having been the first to attempt
to construct a complete system of rules for the regulation of territorial
waters, but his conception varied from that of today. It took the wisdom
of Alberico Gentili, the joint product of an analytical mind and a bent
for seeking the truth, as modified by actually dealing with the problem
in the courts of England, to place the distinction between the high seas
and territorial waters upon a much firmer foundation. As he saw the
picture, it was idle to overlook the self-evident truth that the surface
of the earth over which a state could exercise dominion included both land
and sea, a view in accord with the ancient doctrine. And like Bartolus,
he limited the extent of the territorial sea to one hundred miles, which
might be extended provided the proximity of no other state interfered.
But Gentili carries the doctrine forward. Unlike his predecessors, Bar-
tolus and Baldus, he assimilates the land and the territorial waters into
a single unit, in so far as concerns the powers which the coastal sov-
ereign may exercise over them. Having taken this step, he proceeds
to set up certain limitations upon the sovereign rights of the coastal
state,--limitations based upon an observance of actual practice and
which are even now partially accepted under the rules of international
law. The first limitation placed upon the coastal sovereign was that he
could not deny to foreign ships free passage through territorial waters."' 8
Under the second limitation the power of the coastal sovereign could
not be wielded for the purpose of barring to foreign ships the free use
of harbors, thereby anticipating a rule subsequently adopted by posi-
tive international law. Thus, the territorial sea doctrine, as developed
from certain passages in the works of the glossators, as extended by
assimilating the land to the sea, so far as concerned the power of the
coastal sovereign, emerged in substantially its modern form, under the
practical and guiding genius of Gentili, who, having evolved the doc-
trine, at once placed upon such assimilation those limitations suggested
by the practical necessities of commerce and navigation and by ideas of
natural equity and justice. And all the efforts of those writers who
sought to maintain the right of those powers claiming dominion over
the seas to prohibit foreign ships free passage through their maritime
dominion, were found totally inadequate to support claims which could
be sustained by force alone, and which were "contrary to the spirit of the
new times, directed toward the principles of the absolute liberty of the
high seas and the liberty of passage through the territorial waters."'' 0D
108. In this connection he pointed out that the Venetians, who had frequently denied
free passage to the ships of other nations through the waters over which they claimed
dominion, were acting contrary to natural law. GENTrh, DE JuRE BELU 148 (1598).
109. SERsNi, op. cit. supra note 85, at 75.
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VII. THE TE RITORIAL SEA AND EXCLUSIvE RIGHTS TO THE SEA BED
AND THE SuBsoIL
The issue as to the breadth of the territorial sea and as to who has
the exclusive rights to the sea bed and the subsoil lying thereunder,
along with the question as to whether the territorial zone should be
extended to encompass the continental shelf, was recently projected into
the international limelight by the domestic controversy which developed
between the Federal Government of the United States and the States of
California, Louisiana and Texas."0 The issue was whether the States of
California, Louisiana and Texas or the Federal Government had the
paramount right and power to determine, in the first instance, when,
how and by what agencies, foreign and domestic, the oil and other re-
sources of the soil underlying the ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary
low tide mark on the coast of the said States, known or hereafter dis-
covered, might be exploited. Without going further into the facts and
issues,"' it is sufficient for our purposes here to note that the decision
involved a struggle between the oil industry and the State and Federal
Governments, that the States opposed the administration by the Federal
Government of the natural resources in question, and that the Supreme
Court in effect held that such administration would be in safer hands
if left with the Federal Government. Although the issue was domestic
in the instant cases, by implication it raises the broader question as to
whether the rules of international law recognize the principle that juris-
diction or sovereignty over the soil and subsoil of the continental shelf,
as well as the waters above that shelf beyond the territorial waters,
belong to the riparian state? Originally the concept of the continental
shelf was applied to protect fishing rights, but as the result of a treaty
between Great Britain and Venezuela in 1942 which dealt with the sub-
marine areas of the Gulf of Paria, a new view developed, so that now
the concept is applied to the exploitation of oil and mineral resources.
Annexation was carried out by the two governments under domestic
legislation defining the areas involved, although the agreements them-
selves make no mention of the "continental shelf."' 12 By proclamation,
accompanied by an Executive Order, the President of the United States
declared that "the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the toasts
of the United States" was to be regarded as belonging to the United
110. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 340
U. S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 340 U. S. 707 (1950).
111. For a review of the case, see Reppy, Constitutional Law, in the 1947 Am=uaL
SuRv. A.m. L. 77-81.
112. Compare VA= r, BRrrisH YEARBOOK OF IN ERNATi0nAL LAw 334 (1946).
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States, hence subject to its jurisdiction, as a condition essential to the
conservation and utilization of the resources therein. In no way effected
was the character as high seas of the water above the continental shelf
and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation. A similar Declara-
tion was issued on the same day, setting aside a conservation zone in
which fishing could be carried on subject to the regulation of the Unityd
States, but there was nothing in either Declaration to indicate a rela-
tionship between the two zones. 113 With variations, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Chile, Cuba, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others made proclamations or en-
acted legislation concerning the continental shelf and the rights of the
coastal sovereign therein. Despite these .developments, the number of
states claiming special rights with respect to the resources of the sub-
soil underlying the waters extending beyond established territorial limits
remains small. Other states have not acceded to the claims asserted,
and in a few instances protests have been made. It remains to be deter-
mined whether the rights of control and jurisdiction are to merge in the
right of sovereignty asserted by the coastal state. It also remains to be
seen whether the theoretical right of freedom of navigation, recognized
by all the proclamations as continuing, will be in fact maintained. Is it
not inevitable that once again freedom of navigation will be restricted
under a rule of convenience to be hammered out on the anvil of prac-
tical experience? Will not the fixed and mobile installations, which are
bound to appear as an incident of each nation's exploitation of the re-
sources of the continental shelf to which it lays claim, result necessarily
in a further limitation of freedom of the seas, with a corresponding ex-
tension in fact of tefritorial waters? Will the sea be open when the in-
terests of international shipping are set off against the desire of the
United States to exploit the petroleum resources of the continental shelf
and which she regards as belonging to her? If large mineral or oil
resources are found under the high seas, will not America's rights extend
not merely over those fields below the water but also over the surface
of the sea above those resources? And finally, "Will America find she
can allow Russian cruisers or Japanese fishing craft to make trips be-
tween American drilling derricks erected in the open sea over American
oil fields?"" 4
113. On October 29, 1945, followed by a supplemental decree on February 25, 1949,
Mexico, in an attempt to relate fishery conservation and the continental shelf, laid claim
by proclamation to the entire platform or continental base adjacent to its coasts, and the
resources to be found therein. See DE AZCARROZA Y BUSTAMENTE, Los DERiECHOS SOURE
LA PLATFORIA SUBMARINA, REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, THE PROCLA-
MATION 59 (1949).
114. Fa ANcoIs, REPORT ON THE HIGH SEAS, TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMUMSSION
.39 (2d Sess. March 17, 1950).
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As long as the scope of the concept of the "continental shelf" remains
undefined, as long as the portion of the high sea claimed by each riparian
owner remains uncertain, as long as there is no agreement between states
having a common continental shelf, it seems impossible to accept the
view, as urged by some, that under the rules of international law the
coastal sovereign acquires jurisdiction, if not ownership, over the con-
tinental shelf by virtue of actual occupation. This is merely an oblique
suggestion that the Grotian principle of the freedom of the seas is not an
absolute; that such concept is capable of further limitation, that the new
scientific developments, when coupled with new economic problems, and
new problems of national defense, are in fact on the very verge of enforc-
ing new limitations upon the freedom of the seas doctrine. In the
face of such a problem internationalization of the continental shelf,
as common territory, has been suggested, but this idea has been
rejected in favor of giving the coastal state a controlling position
in the adjacent waters. Exploitation by the first general occupant,
as urged by some, might present a serious situation if such exploitation
took place in the continental shelf only a short distance from the shore
of the coastal sovereign. Such a policy would almost certainly produce
national rivalry and friction, neither beneficial to international society,
nor calculated to conserve the natural resources of the subsoil.
According to Feith, "The best solution appears to be to allot the
continental shelf to the riparian State, on the condition that such allot-
ment is accompanied, at the outset, by a precise definition of the rights
and duties of the various States in these areas. Provided that the privi-
leged State confines itself, on the one hand, to the efficient working of
the mineral resources of the continental shelf, without intolerable vio-
lation of the principle of the freedom of the seas, and, on the other
hand, to protecting the resources of the sea without monopolizing the
right to fish for the benefit of its nationals, the principle of the freedom
of the seas would appear to be adequately safeguarded."11 r
Whether such a solution should be made dependent upon the exist-
ence of a continental shelf extending from the coastal state claiming the
right to exploit the mineral resources of the subsoil and the marine re-
sources, raises another delicate problem, as such a rule would discrimi-
nate against those states having no continental shelf, or at least one
not reaching beyond the territorial waters. In this situation, Feith sug-
gests that it might be better to discard the concept of the continental
shelf, in favor of a grant to riparian states of special rights extending a
specified distance beyond their territorial waters."1
11. See FE=T, RFPORT TO Tim LNTmPNAToxaNL LAWv AssocsATioI, 19 (1948).
116. Id. at 40. This pretention would change the whole concept of the subsoil theory.
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VIII. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
In the meantime, the situation may be summed up as follows:
1. It is now apparent, in the light of the new claims to rights in
the subsoil and in the resources to be found in the continental shelf
that the limit of territorial waters is in process of being extended in
accordance with the change of technical conditions. In this situation,
in order to avoid chaos, such extension can only be carried out inter-
nationally and equally, not municipally. Obviously, the enlargement of
the territorial waters of the coastal states will involve the exclusion of
a considerable amount of space from the free seas.
2. The limit of the subsoil subject to the sovereignty of the coastal
state may differ from the limit of territorial waters. Such a limit seems
essential as no state can be permitted to claim rights to the subsoil
thousands of miles from its shores and the shores of its islands. More-
over, while the limit of territorial waters may be independent of the
structure of the coast, the limit of the subsoil may be influenced by its
structure, as for example, in the case of the reef extending along the
Western coast of Australia.
3. The use of the subsoil will almost inevitably involve restrictions
upon the freedom of the sea. Thus, foreign ships may not expect to
move freely in the vicinity of installations erected by the coastal sov-
ereign for the purpose of exploitation of the subsoil. Such exploitation
should be carried on in a way which may restrict yet never destroy
the freedom of the sea. Where a conflict develops in theory the princi-
ple of the freedom of the sea should prevail over the right to exploit
the subsoil. The same principle also applies, in a lesser degree, to ter-
ritorial waters. No state should use its jurisdiction over its territorial
waters, whatever their extent may be, in a way calculated to prevent
the free movement of ships, except in an emergency.
4. In the case of artificial islands, as formed perhaps by sea dromes,
it would seem that they should be treated under regulations similar
to those governing "permanent ships," and that the regulations for such
purpose should be framed internationally and not municipally.
5. Fauna, flora, minerals, chemicals and all intermediary forms in
the sea, outside of the territorial waters, belong to the sea and not to
the subsoil. They are, therefore, subject to seizure and exploitation by
anybody, up to the moment of physical contact made by someone with
the intention of taking possession. Thus, the whale belongs to the first
person who is able to shoot a harpoon into its body, under the principle
that over, on and in the free seas everyone is free to exploit those riches,
and that none may legally prevent another from so doing.
6. Under modern conditions, the freedom of the sea reaches above
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and below the surface of the water. In the downward direction, it ex-
tends to the subsoil outside the territorial waters, but inside the subsoil
rights of the coastal state, and into the subsoil beyond this limit, as for
example, in the case of the right to lay cables, fish or exploit other riches
not connected with the subsoil. So also neutral commercial submarines
in time of war in order to avoid seizure might travel under the surface
of the sea, as well as in times of peace in order to avoid hampering of
free trade.
7. Finally, the use of the free sea in any way which prevents others
from making use of it is illegal. Thus, the Declaration of Panama
must be understood merely as a protest against the use of those parts
of the free sea in which they have special interests in such a manner
as to endanger free trade. The proclamation forbade acts of war in
those areas because they endangered the freedom of the sea. And so, in
the future, the explosion of an atomic bomb impairing the usability of a
considerable area of the ocean for a certain period would constitute an
act of doubtful validity, and therefore, if to be done, such explosion
should only be permitted after due precautions had been taken to
protect the rights of other users of the sea. Also, ships traveling a
certain distance from each other and sending out rays which endanger
the use of the sea over a considerable space would constitute an in-
fringement of the right of passage through the free sea.
IX. CoNcrusIoN
The Grotian doctrine of freedom of the seas has never at any time
in the history of mankind enjoyed a status of total validity, either in
theory or in fact. In the long period prior to Grotius, the issue was
largely academic, because one great power after another asserted and
maintained dominion of the seas in theory and also in fact. This situa-
tion is generally thought to have undergone a change with the promul-
gation of the principle of freedom of navigation by Grotius. But even
as Grotius framed the doctrine it was not in terms an absolute doctrine,
as he in effect limited his own principle by exceptions which be made
in favor of the nations adjacent to inland bays, gulfs and straits. Nor
was the doctrine immediately accepted in theory or in fact by the states
of the world. On the fact side it was met by the voyages of Cavendish
and Drake and by England's assertion of mastery over the English seas,
by the continued claims of supremacy of Portugal and Spain over the
East Indian seas; and by Swedish and Danish activities over the
Northern seas.
On the theoretical side, Grotius was opposed by Selden, whose argu-
ments constituted the theoretical basis of the English opposition to the
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Grotian conception, which opposition was so sweeping in its implications
and in its practical application as to cause a reaction to set in among
the weaker maritime powers of the world, in favor of the free seas
principle. Thus, it was the opposition of the English as justified and
stirred up by Selden, rather than the principle of free seas as announced
by Grotius, which gave the free sea doctrine a tremendous push in the
direction of universal recognition. This development, coupled with the
gradual recognition by the states of the world that as a practical day-
to-day matter, it was impossible for any one state to police the seas of
the whole world, or to exert any effective, exclusive dominion of the
same, led to a policy on the part of each state, of policing the waters
adjacent to their shores, so that commerce could be maintained, with an
assertion of jurisdiction beyond such limits for the purpose of punishing
crime or repressing piracy. The principle of the free seas as it actually
took shape was in no sense a Grotian conception. It originated in
Roman law, it was crystallized and clearly stated by the Spanish theo-
logians, Vitoria, Suarez and Carruvias, it was formulated as a rule
of international law by Gentili, and it was given wide currency by Gro-
tius as an incident of the commotion which developed in Europe over
the capture of the Portuguese prize, the Catherina. But none of these
developments actually exercised much influence in the sense of directing
men's minds toward a belief in the principle. It was the misconduct of
England, as justified by Selden's masterful analysis and dissection of
Grotius' concept, which turned the tide. This development, plus the
practical necessities of everyday intercourse, led to the recognition of
the principle of the free seas as a rule of convenience. With this rule
once firmly established by the realities of life, its advocates have called
to its support the long line of legal authorities, which we have traced
and which some have mistakenly accepted as the cause rather than the
effect. In other words, while the theorists were arguing in the books,
the realities of everyday practice had established the reality of free
seas, in such a way as to make the discussions of the scholars purely
academic, as in the early part of the present century, the flight of the
aeroplane over real estate converted the cujus est solum rule of owner-
ship into an academic theory.
And so today, as a result of the projection upon the international
scene of the rights of the coastal sovereign to the subsoil underlying
territorial waters and extending beyond, along the line of the conti-
nental shelf, which necessarily raises the issue as to the control, juris-
diction or ownership of the surface of the water above such shelf, the
world finds itself once more in a great period of transition, in which,
aside from existing rules of international law, the rights of the states
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over subsoil extending over the normal territorial waters limit, and along
the continental shelf, will again be hammered out on the anvil of experi-
ence. When the practice has thus been determined upon, it may then
be incorporated into the body of international law by the customary
methods. But it will still remain true that the rule thus esablished, and
which will inevitably further restrict the Grotian principle of the free
seas, will have originated not out of some natural or positivist or other
theory of law, but will stand forth merely as the newest product of the
ceaseless struggle of each nation to control more than its just share of
the seas which the captive and exiled son of revolted Holland, Grotius,
declared belonged in common to all mankind and not to any one
country.117
117. On the indebtedness of the World to Hugo Grotius, aside from his freedom of the
seas doctrine, see 1 WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 144-148, 330-337 (1899).
But see Fruin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 59, in which he declares: "But before I should
concede to De Groot's panegyrists that he is the creator of the law of nations I should
like to know what is meant by that honourable appellation. Does it mean that De Groot
discovered and revealed what before him had been taught by no one, then I should object
to give him the title. For by far the greater part of what had been demonstrated by De
Groot had already been said by older writers, in other words and dressed up in othei
arguments, but still essentially the same. He acknowledges this himself, he only claims
the merit of having been the first to point out the right to take booty; regarding the right
of war he appeals to the authority of his predecessors. If he had been asked wherein
the peculiar merit of his system consisted, he would have answered, as in the prolegomnena
of his Jus beri ac pads 'Artis formam jurisprudentiae imponere multi antehac destinarunt;
perfecit nemo.' What others had viewed correctly or had represented in itself correctly,
but without connection with other ideas, was collected by him, arranged and combined
to form a system. This,*then, is the merit to which he lays claim and which he fully
deserves. He constructed the building, but of material furnished by others. Without their
previous labour his work would have been impossible. He acknowledges this gratefully
and openly; but his contemporaries and descendants have overlooked the fact and given
him all the honour."
